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This dissertation applies the tools of network analysis to study job mobility. Job
mobility is a complex phenomenon, and network theory provides a novel and
practical framework for dealing with this complexity in understanding how in-
dividuals move from job to job. My first essay measures the effect of job referral
networks on search outcomes. The key contribution of this essay is providing
evidence of one mechanism by which social interactions affect earnings. An on-
the-job search model extended to include social transmission of job information
yields an empirical specification in which ones current job offer depends on the
average offer of his social contacts. Using block level variation in the quality
of jobs held by ones residential neighbors, I find that when changing jobs an
individual with better local network contacts will obtain a higher quality job.
In addition to the main result, this paper provides new evidence on the spa-
tial structure of the wage distribution within urban areas. In the second essay
I apply network algorithms to detect groups of workers and employers with
relatively homogeneous patterns of job mobility. Workers with interchangeable
skills should have similar patterns of mobility across employers that use those
skills in roughly the same way. Grouping workers and jobs solely on the basis
of similar mobility patterns reveals labor market sectors with distinct compen-
sation structures. My final essay, joint with John Abowd, uses network models
to facilitate identification of employer-specific wage premia in a decomposition
of log earnings from matched employer-employee data.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Job mobility is a complex phenomenon, and network theory provides a novel
and practical framework for dealing with this complexity in understanding how
individuals move from job to job. The first chapter in this dissertation, Job Re-
ferral Networks and the Determination of Earnings in Local Labor Markets, studies
the use of personal contacts to search for work is a ubiquitous and persistent
feature of modern labor markets. How do social networks direct the flow of job
information? What implications might they have for labor market efficiency, the
spatial concentration of poverty, and income mobility? To shed new light on this
topic, I model and empirically evaluate the role of neighborhood-level referral
networks in job search. I identify positive and economically signification effects
of the quality of jobs held by a workers neighbors on the quality of his next job.
These are the first results on direct local interactions in earnings determination
estimated in the context of a job search model.
In a labor market characterized by search frictions, identical workers may
be paid different amounts by different employers. Those looking for jobs seek
out higher rents, and workers holding jobs prefer to share these rents with their
friends and neighbors. To capture this process of social rent sharing, I extend
an on-the-job search model with worker and employer heterogeneity to include
social interactions in job search. In the model, individuals are more likely to
sample a job with the same premium as their neighbors. Relative to a baseline
model without contagion, social interactions generate excess correlation in out-
comes between connected workers. The model also predicts that workers with
better social contacts will experience better outcomes from job-to-job mobility.
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To test these predictions, I use data on individual work histories from the
Census Bureaus Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Pro-
gram matched to residential addresses. I estimate the job search model on
estimates of firm-specific wage premia derived from a decomposition of log
earnings into worker- and employer-specific heterogeneity components. The
employer-specific wage premia conform to two stylized facts consistent with
the model. First, there is evidence of a job ladder: workers tend to move into
jobs with better wage premia. Second, there is significant spatial correlation
of wage premia for jobs held by individual workers for detailed geographies.
These stylized facts are novel, and provide evidence of the importance of sort-
ing for the spatial distribution of earnings.
I identify the contribution to job search outcomes of the quality of lo-
cal social networks from quasi-random assignment of workers to residential
blocks within larger neighborhoods. This facilitates distinguishing neighbor-
hood quality from network quality. Neighborhood quality affects search out-
comes through a number of channels, for instance differential access to trans-
portation. Workers residential location decisions are made on the basis of neigh-
borhood quality, but they cannot sort perfectly by block. Thus, the variation in
network quality within the neighborhood is exogenous. I measure ones local
network quality from the distribution of employer-specific wage premia held
by workers from the same residential block. My model predicts the excess spa-
tial correlation found in employer wage premia at the block level beyond that
found at the tract level. Both conventional and quantile regressions confirm
that the relationship between network quality and job search outcomes is sig-
nificant, economically meaningful, and conforms to the predictions of my en-
hanced search model.
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The purpose of the research embodied in the second chapter is to place
workers and employers into groups that are relatively homogeneous with re-
spect to job mobility. Theory suggests that workers with interchangeable skills
should have similar patterns of mobility across employers that use those skills
in roughly the same way. Alternatively, in a model of labor market segmenta-
tion, workers in the secondary sector of the labor market cannot easily move
into the primary sector in which access to jobs may be rationed. Both models
imply that one can infer homogeneous groups of workers and jobs from pat-
terns in longitudinal data on job mobility.
The key contribution of this paper is to apply the tools of network analysis
to find these homogeneous groups of workers and jobs from patterns of job mo-
bility. Job-to-job mobility is modeled as a realized mobility network connecting
workers to employers. The empirical component of the paper uses data from
the PSID to construct a realized mobility network connecting workers to the de-
tailed industry-occupation pairs in which they are employed. Assuming work-
ers are more likely to change jobs within a segment than to exit yields a likeli-
hood function over all possible partitions of the network. Although this prob-
lem has high dimension, it is possible to maximize the likelihood function by
simulated annealing. The resulting estimates group industry-occupation pairs
into two groups with distinct employment patterns, and compensation profiles.
Separating jobs solely on the basis of mobility patterns reveals a small sector
in which earnings determination is highly correlated with education and min-
imally correlated with demographic characteristics relative to the larger sector.
The smaller sector is made up of professional and managerial occupations in the
service and finance sectors. By contrast, the larger sector is made up of clerical,
3
service, and routine labor. Using an alternative measure of network clustering, I
find evidence that the labor market contains at least five large economically and
demographically-distinct groups of workers. The same patterns are replicated,
but with some refinement. The largest two sectors are split between service and
manufacturing jobs at all occupational levels, with three smaller sectors cen-
tered on specific occupational groups.
The final chapter, Endogenous Mobility, is joint with John Abowd. We pro-
pose and implement a method for bounding the amount of endogeneity bias
in estimates of person- and employer-specific earnings heterogeneity. Unbiased
and efficient estimates of these quantities are needed for applications in labor
economics, empirical industrial organization, and macroeconomics. We instru-
ment for observed work histories with simulations drawn from a model for the
evolution of the realized mobility network that connects workers and employ-
ers over time. To demonstrate this technique, we specify and estimate a model
in which both earnings, job separations, and job assignments are fully endoge-
nous. Using simulated data, we estimate the posterior distribution of the pa-
rameters governing wage determination. We find that we are able to detect and
correct for endogenous mobility bias in the simulated data.
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CHAPTER 2
JOB REFERRAL NETWORKS AND THE DETERMINATION OF
EARNINGS IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I study a previously unexplored connection between two features
of the U.S. labor market. The first is that who you know affects where you work.
The second is that where you work affects how much you are paid. Getting job
information from friends and neighbors is a common strategy, and apparently a
productive one: between 30 and 60 percent of new jobs are found through per-
sonal contacts (Bewley 1999). Why is referral use so prominent? What does this
prominence mean for the way the labor markets operate? These remain open
questions. One role for referral networks in job search is in helping workers
locate information about particularly attractive job opportunities. Two workers
can receive different pay simply because they work in different firms (Abowd
et al. 1999). If workers share information about these pay differentials with their
friends and neighbors, then who you know can affect how much you are paid.
The goal of this paper is to identify the role of local referral networks in
the assignment of employer-specific pay differentials. In doing so, I provide the
first direct evidence of referral effects and neighborhood interactions in earnings
determination. I find that workers engaged in on-the-job search receive a pos-
itive and significant fraction of their job offers through local interactions. Fur-
thermore, workers who change jobs receive offers with higher pay differentials
when workers in their local referral networks are earning higher differentials.
These results are robust to various specifications that attempt to address sorting
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and to correct for sample selection on the quality of one’s current job. The mag-
nitude of the effect is very similar to self-reported levels of referral use among
employed workers found in survey data (Ioannides and Loury 2004). My em-
pirical approach relies on workers being likely to interact with their residential
neighbors in searching for better jobs. To check the validity of my approach,
I extend the model to allow for differences in the productivity of local referral
networks between native and non-native workers. I find that the magnitude of
the effect of local interactions on job quality are almost twice as strong for non-
native workers as for natives, consistent with previous research showing that
non-native workers are more likely to use referrals to find work.
My research makes several important contributions to the literature on the
role of local social interactions in labor market outcomes. This is the first pa-
per to directly identify and estimate local spillovers in earnings determination.
Previous research on neighborhood effects has either focused on neighborhood-
level effects in social behaviors correlated with income, or on how neighbor-
hood characteristics affect labor market outcomes (see Ioannides and Loury
(2004) for an extensive survey). I am able to make progress because I can sep-
arate the part of earnings associated with job assignment from the part due to
an individual worker’s portable skills. I also have a clean strategy for identify-
ing social interactions in job assignments and earnings by exploiting variation
in network quality within neighborhoods. This strategy is derived from Bayer
et al. (2008) who use it to identify local interactions in job location. They do not
focus on direct spillovers in earnings determination, and do not relate their find-
ings to a formal model of job search. Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2007) do
use a formal job search model to estimate local interactions in unemployment
in a formal job search model, but lack a clean identification strategy. In addi-
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tion to its primary contributions, this paper is the first to verify that employer-
specific wage premia have a mobility-related structure that is consistent with a
job search model. It is also the first to document the spatial structure in the dis-
tribution of earnings components using employer-employee matched data for
the United States.
To obtain my results, I develop and empirically implement a model of job
search in which workers use local referrals to share information about pay dif-
ferentials. In order to outline the model and empirical work, I reserve the term
‘quality’ to refer to the pay differential on a particular job in a shorthand way. In
this paper, I focus just on quality in terms of employer-specific pay differentials,
finding that this dimension of quality matters theoretically and empirically.
I start by modelling a job search process in which information about job
quality passes through referral networks. Consistent with empirical evidence
and a range of job search models, employers are distinguished by idiosyncratic
pay differentials. These pay differentials are non-market rents that accrue to
the workers who find them. A worker searching for a job can use his referral
network to try to find these rents. Likewise, a worker who knows about an
employer with particularly attractive terms will share that information with his
friends and neighbors. In the model, I allow workers to search for better jobs
through direct contact with employers or by sampling offers of the same quality
as one of their employed social network contacts. The distribution of job offers
has a simple form in which the average quality of a worker’s job offer depends
directly on the the average quality of his neighbors’ jobs. I derive an economet-
ric model for the offer function along with implications for the conditional mean
and quantiles of the observed job quality distribution.
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Then, to identify local referral effects in job quality, I use employer-employee
matched data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD)
Program. The empirical work has two components. First, I obtain measures of
the quality of jobs held by all private sector, non-farm workers. I take these from
a decomposition of log earnings into components associated with individual
and employer heterogeneity as described in Abowd et al. (2002). I then link the
job quality estimates to the exact residential block for workers who lived in one
of 30 large Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 2002-2003. Using these data,
I identify local interactions in job quality by exploiting variation in the average
quality of jobs within a relatively small reference group of neighboring blocks.
The empirical model is related to the conventional neighborhood effects
specification where an individual’s expected behavior depends on the average
behavior of his neighbors. The model therefore raises the same identification
issues first noted by Manski (1993) and summarized by Blume and Durlauf
(2005). I avoid Manski’s reflection problem by exploiting the time-dimension in
my data to construct measures of local referral quality that are predetermined
at the time of an observed job transition. More problematic is the difficulty of
separating the effects of local referral effects from other economic processes, in-
cluding residential sorting, that might cause job search outcomes to be spatially
correlated.
Adapting the research design of Bayer et al. (2008), I identify the contribution
to job search outcomes of the quality of local social networks from quasi-random
assignment of workers to residential blocks within larger neighborhoods. This
facilitates distinguishing neighborhood quality from network quality. Neigh-
borhood quality affects search outcomes through a number of channels, for in-
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stance differential access to transportation. Workers residential location deci-
sions are made on the basis of neighborhood quality, but they cannot sort per-
fectly by block. Thus, the variation in network quality within the neighbor-
hood is exogenous. I measure ones local network quality from the distribution
of employer-specific wage premia held by workers from the same residential
block. My model predicts the excess spatial correlation found in employer wage
premia at the block level beyond that found at the tract level. Both conventional
and quantile regressions confirm that the relationship between network quality
and job search outcomes is significant, economically meaningful, and conforms
to the predictions of my enhanced search model.
The estimation results are driven by two stylized features of the distribu-
tion of estimated employer-specific wage premia. First, there is a ‘job ladder’
in the sense that workers who change jobs are more likely to move from lower-
to higher-quality jobs (Figure 2.2). Second, job quality is spatially correlated at
the level of the Census block (Figure 2.4). I show that these features are char-
acteristic of the on-the-job search model with local referral networks, and then
show that they hold in the estimated distribution of employer wage premia.
My analysis of the spatial correlation of earnings, human capital, and employer
characteristics is among the most geographically detailed of its type for U.S.
cities. My results also confirm that much of the observed sorting in earnings is
correlated with sorting on observable and unobservable human capital charac-
teristics (Combes et al. 2008; Conley and Topa 2002a). These results are relevant
to those studying residential sorting by earnings, human capital characteristics,
and employer characteristics in urban labor markets.
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2.2 A Model of Job Search with Referral Networks
I model on-the-job search with social interactions in the transmission of infor-
mation about new job opportunities. Different employers offer different pay to
the same worker, but workers do not know the size of the wage premium of-
fered by any particular employer. They must engage in a process of search to
collect information about new jobs. I allow for the possibility that the produc-
tivity of the search process may depend on individual characteristics, neigh-
borhood quality, and the quality of the jobs held by people in one’s referral
network.
This model of wage-setting is motivated by the empirical finding that em-
ployer specific heterogeneity explains a large portion of the dispersion in log
earnings (Abowd et al. 1999; 2002). This is consistent with a primary theoreti-
cal result of job search models, which show that information imperfections lead
labor markets to fail to eliminate all idiosyncratic differences in pay between
employers (Rogerson et al. 2005). The wage function given here could arise in
a matching model with worker and employer heterogeneity in production with
surplus sharing when there is no wage renegotiation (Postel-Vinay and Robin
2002).
Time evolves continuously and the observed data are snapshots taken at dis-
crete intervals. To clarify the presentation, I denote a model variable, say earn-
ings of the ith worker, evolving in continuous time, as y(i, t). The data observed
from this process are denoted as yi1, yi2, ..., yiT where each yiτ is an observation
on this process at time t = τ. For the remainder of this section, I use notation
indicating the continuous time evolution of the model.
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The model is populated by a finite group of workers and a continuum of
employers. Let i ∈ {1 . . . I} index workers and j index employers. Workers are
heterogeneous in the characteristics that affect productivity and pay. Let e(t; i)
denote the stock of human capital characteristics held by worker i at time t.
Different employers compensate workers differently. Let p j > 0 be the idiosyn-
cratic component of employer pay. The earnings function, y(e(t; i), p j) satisifies
log-separability. That is,
ln y(e(t; i), p j) = ln y1(e(t; i)) + ψ j,
where ψ j = ln y2(p j). ψ j is the log-wage premium paid by employer j.
The model specifies the continuous time evolution of the I × 1 vector of as-
signments of workers to employers with different wage premia, Ψ(t) Workers
are infinitely lived and can be either employed or unemployed. They search for
jobs paying higher premia. The arrival of job offers is a Poisson process with un-
employed workers receiving new job information at Poisson rate λ0. Employed
workers receive job information at rate λ1. Jobs can end due to exogenous pro-
ductivity shocks that occur at rate δ. I assume that these contact and separation
rates are exogenous and common across workers. The only decision that work-
ers make is whether to accept a job when they receive an offer. I assume that
workers receive utility in unemployment equivalent to getting a job with wage
premium pb.
When a worker receives a job offer, it is sampled from an employer offering
the log wage premium ψ with probability f (ψ; i, t). As the notation indicates,
the sampling distribution differs across workers and can change over time. This
distribution is a mixture of a formal market offer distribution, denoted g(ψ; i, t)
and the distribution of job offers of one’s social contacts, denoted h(ψ; i, t).
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The parameter a measures the strength of social interactions relative to for-
mal channels in delivering new job offers. It is the object of primary interest
in the empirical analysis. I specify the relationship between formal search and
referral networks as a simple mixture. A worker samples an offer, ψ, from either
the distribution of offers in the formal market, g(ψ; i, t), or from the distribution
of offers that come through his referral network, h(ψ; i, t). Thus conditional on
receiving an offer, the worker draws its type from the distribution
f (ψ; i, t) = ag(ψ; i, t) + (1 − a)h(ψ; i, t). (2.1)
In setting up the model, I maintain that a is identical across workers. In the
empirical work, I estimate the model under this restriction, but also allow for
heterogeneity in a on observable characteristics. For this to be a model of job
information transmission through referrals, it is necessary to explicitly specify
the relationship between social structure and the distribution of job offers. I turn
to this task next.
2.2.1 Job Offers Through Referrals
Social interactions in job search follow a contact process in which individuals
receive information about job opportunities from their neighbors. The trans-
mission of this job information is stylized as a contagion process from epidemi-
ology. When searching, workers either sample from a fixed ‘formal market’ offer
distribution, or may sample an offer of the same type as one of their employed
friends. The formal offer distribution describes the availability of jobs received
when applying directly to employers, answering ads or knocking on doors. The
informal offer distribution describes the probability of receiving a job of a par-
ticular type conditional on the number of your social contacts who already hold
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that type of job. Here, the types of jobs held by ones neighbors are ‘contagious’
in the sense that their social network partners are at increased risk to get an of-
fer for the same type of job as one they already hold. This captures the intuition
that personal referrals are explicitly used to find and share information about
particularly attractive, employer specific wage premia. Conley and Topa (2007)
assumes a similar contact process, but for the case of transitions into employ-
ment, whereas I consider transitions across employers with different productive
characteristics.
Let W be an I × I stochastic matrix whose ( ji)th entry measures the probabil-
ity that job information received by i through a referral originated with worker
j. In the empirical work, I relax the assumption that social structure is exoge-
nous since I allow for the possibility that people sort into neighborhoods on
the basis of unobservable characteristics that might be correlated with their job
search outcome. I consider the class of social interactions models for which the
distribution of offers received through referrals satisfies
Eh(ψ|W, i,Ψ(t)) =
(
wi
)T
Ψ(t), (2.2)
where wi is the ith column of W. This specification is consistent with models of
information transmission where proximity to workers with better wage premia
results in better expected offers. One such model is a contagion process where
the probability of receiving an offer with log wage premium ψ is increasing in
proximity to workers already holding jobs paying that premium:
h(ψ; i, t) =
(
wi
)T
1 (Ψ(t) = ψ) . (2.3)
This model captures the intuition that referrals are used to share information
about particularly attractive wage premia. In the empirical work, I identify the
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effects of social networks by the quasi-random variation in the residential loca-
tion choices of individual workers. Since this variation facilitates the identifica-
tion of local neighborhood interactions, I will specify W in terms of residential
proximity.
The construction of h in equation 2.3 embeds the assumptions that there are
no demand-side constraints that affect the distribution of offers through the
referral network. This is consistent with the partial equilibrium nature of the
model. Second, and more crucial, is the assumption that the probability that
i receives an offer ψ through referral, h(ψ; i, t) is independent of the offer re-
ceived by another worker k at t. In other words, i and k are not competitors
for the same scarce piece of job information. This assumption is a key feature
of the contagion approach, and differs from related models that focus on the
routing of job information across social networks in partial or general equilib-
rium search and matching models (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvo-
Armengol and Zenou 2005, Wahba and Zenou 2005). Their models emphasize
congestion effects in the transmission of job information alongside contagion
effects. Congestion occurs when many workers in a social network are com-
peting for the same job information. As Wahba and Zenou (2005) have shown,
network congestion effects lead to empirically verified non-linearities in the use
and effects of social contacts to find work.
In this paper, I abstract from congestion effects to focus on identfying the ef-
fect of local network quality on job search outcomes. This abstraction eliminates
dependencies between worker’s outcomes in the instantaneous cross-section.
More plainly, taking network quality as given, the job offers received by any
worker are independent of those received by any other worker. This assump-
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tion is approximately correct if the congestion effect is trivially small relative to
the contagion effect. Modeling social interactions in job search as a contagion
process allows independence in individual job search outcomes.
This approach is an extension of Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). They
develop a general equilibrium labor market model with on-the-job search. Like
my model, workers can either sample an offer from the formal offer distribution,
or sample directly from the distribution of realized job offers. This is equivalent
to my model in the case where there is no heterogeneity in the underlying re-
ferral network and all workers are equally likely to be sampled for job informa-
tion. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2007) also have a partial equilibrium model
of job search, but allow for a more general specification of transmission of job
information. Their model yields clean theoretical results, but does not lend it-
self as easily to empirical evaluation. Some of the papers already discussed,
along with the work of Fontaine (2007) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2002), use a
different kind of contact process to stylize the social transmission of job infor-
mation. These ‘urn-ball’ models facilitate evaluation of equilibrium dynamics
in frictional search and matching models, but do not lend themselves to estima-
tion of social interaction effects in job search outcomes from data on individual
job histories.
2.2.2 Implications
The search model with these simple behavioral rules regarding job mobility
yields a continuous-time Markov process over assignments of workers to types
of jobs. In the case where the social interaction parameter (1 − a) ≡ 0, there are
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no referral network effects, and the observed job transitions are i.i.d. samples
from the same (conditional) Markov process. When a , 1 there are spillovers
leading to correlations in the state vector. It is conceptually straightforward to
define a transition kernel, Q(Z,W) for the evolution of Ψ(t) from the primitives
of the mobility model, λ, δ, a, h and g. The notation reflects the dependence
of the kernel on a matrix of observable worker characteristics, Z and the social
distance matrix, W. The full mobility model has the form:
Y(t) = ln y1(E(t)) + Ψ(t) + ε(t) (2.4)
Pr(Ψ(t)|Ψ(t − ∆)) = exp(Q(Z,W)∆)Ψ(t − ∆), (2.5)
where Y(t) is a vector of observed log earnings, E(t) is an I × 1 matrix of time-
varying human capital characteristics, and ε(t) is a vector of errors. The term
exp(Q(ZQ,D)∆) refers to the matrix exponential. The model delivers simple pre-
dictions for the stationary distribution of Ψ(t).
First, I derive some basic properties of a job search model with social in-
teractions in job offers. These suggest certain stylized features that should be
observed in the data. Job-to-job transitions will involve moves to employers
paying higher wage premia. Second, job mobility is a Markov process whose
steady state distribution generates excess correlation between workers in the
same referral network. This is related to a similar finding in Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson (2007) I argue on the basis of simulation results that correlations
in the employer-specific wage premia are stronger for workers who are socially
closer according to W.
That workers always accept a job paying a higher premium follows from the
assumptions that they like money and that the evolution of their portable skills,
e(t; i), is independent of job assignment. The latter assumption may not hold
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if workers choose jobs both for their wage premia and also to optimize wage
growth associated with experience in particular sector. It allows me to focus on
the role of wage premia in job assignment and job mobility. It is probably not
a bad approximation for workers who supply labor in jobs where there is little
human capital specificity, and also for workers who have already selected a ca-
reer and are changing jobs within their chosen field to maximize earnings (Neal,
1999). My main results are based on estimates of the model for all workers, but
to acknowledge the preceding argument, I also allow for heterogeneity in the
parameter a to accomodate the possibility that the model may more accurately
describe certain groups of workers than others. To foreshadow the results, I
find that my estimates of local interactions in job search are much stronger for
non-native than for native workers.
Even though it is a standard feature of on-the-job search models, to clarify
the restrictions on the present model needed to establish the result that workers
move to jobs paying higher premia, I restate it formally as a proposition:
Proposition 1 In the job search model described above, assume workers are ex-
pected wealth maximizers and e(t; i) is independent of work history. Further,
assume workers are myopic about the evolution of the offer distribution. Then
employed workers will always accept an offer of a job paying a higher wage
premium. In addition, unemployed workers follow a reservation strategy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The previous result is true for most models of on-the-job search. The next
result is specific to a model with on-the-job search with social transmission of job
information. It simply states that the correlation in job assignment for socially
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connected workers is positive, and increasing in their social proximity according
to W. If this is not true, then it is not clear that there is any empirical content to
the social interaction model. Specifically, I claim the following:
Proposition 2 The stationary distribution of Ψ is such that
Wii′ > Wii′′ implies cov(ψi, ψi′) > cov(ψi, ψi′′)
That is, correlations in employer-specific wage premia are stronger for work-
ers who are socially closer according to W
Supporting Proposition 2 are results from a simulation of the contagion
model. Workers reside in a set of contiguous blocks that are arranged in a circle,
so that each block is adjacent to two other blocks. Every block holds 100 work-
ers, and they are socially connected to workers residing on the same block, and
also to workers residing on adjacent blocks. The social proximity to workers
on the same block is greater than the proximity to workers on adjacent blocks.
I assume zero social proximity between workers who do not live on the same
or adjacent blocks. Specifically, workers are expected to have 15 social contacts
out of 100 on their block and anywhere from 0 to 10 out of 100 on each adjacent
block. There are only two wage premium levels in the simulation. Without so-
cial interactions, that is when the number of social contacts on adjacent blocks is
zero, the spatial correlation in the fraction of workers earning high wage premia
between adjacent blocks is 0.0065. As the number of contacts rises from zero to
ten, the the spatial correlation rises to 0.85. Thus, in an economy with stronger
social interactions among adjacent blocks, we see increased spatial correlation,
consistent with the theoretical prediction.
Once these two results are verified in the data, the goal is to check whether
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the relationship between referral network quality and job search outcomes ex-
ists and conforms to the predictions of the model. A job-to-job switch is an
observation from a stochastic process whose mean is E(ψ|ψ > ψ0,Z,W,Ψ0) where
ψ0 is the log wage premium on the worker’s current job and Ψ0 is the vector of
log wage premia held by all workers at the time of the transition. The following
proposition shows that an increase in network quality will increase the mean of
the truncated offer distribution:
Proposition 3 If the distribution of offers received through referral, h, is log con-
cave and
∣∣∣Eg(ψ|ψ > ψ0,Z,W,Ψ0) − Eh(ψ|ψ > ψ0,Z,W,Ψ0)∣∣∣ is small then
∂µ f ∗(ψ0)
∂µh
> 0
where µ f ∗(ψ0) = E(ψ|ψ > ψ0,Z,W,Ψ0) and µh = Eh(ψ|Z,W,Ψ0)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The requirement that
∣∣∣Eg(ψ|Z,W,Ψ0) − Eh(ψ|Z,W,Ψ0)∣∣∣ is small may be restric-
tive, but is probably satisfied in practice. It says that the distribution of accept-
able offers from referrals is not too different from the distribution of accept-
able offers from formal search. The jobs available through the referral network
should generally be fairly close to the distribution of offers that workers would
receive through formal search, including those features of job search productiv-
ity that are correlated across individuals.
The job search model also yields predictions on the quantiles of the truncated
offer distribution. I evaluate these in the empirical work as additional checks of
the validity of the job search model
Proposition 4 If the cumulative distribution function of the wage premium of-
fer distribution, F(ψ), is log concave, twice continuously differentiable, and its
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density function symmetric, then (i) an increase in ψ0 has a monotonically de-
creasing effect on quantiles of the ψ distribution, (ii) anything that increases the
mean of the offer distribution has an increasing effect on quantiles of the ψ dis-
tribution.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the search model, increasing ψ0 affects outcomes by increasing the reser-
vation offer that triggers mobility. Intuitively, increasing ψ0 will have a larger
impact on the distribution of acceptable offers close to the trunaction point than
those further away. The condition of proposition 4, that the offer distribution
is log concave with a symmetric density, is satisfied by the normal distribution,
the uniform distribution, and the double exponential.
2.3 The Determination of Job Search Outcomes: Econometric
Framework
I estimate the social interaction parameter using data on observed job-to-job
transitions that have been linked to data on workers’ blocks of residence. I fol-
low a two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage consists of estimating
employer-specific wage premia from a complete history of matched employer-
employee data. The second stage treats these estimates as data in estimating
the offer function for employed workers. This procedure is consistent under the
assumption that the wage error ε(t) from equation 2.4 is orthogonal to the mo-
bility process in equation 2.5. This assumption is explicit in my search model,
and conforms to the standard exogenous mobility assumption for consistent es-
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timation of the parameters of the log-linear earnings decomposition (Abowd
et al. 1999).
To assuage concerns about the validity of these assumptions, I test that the
distribution of estimated wage premia, ψˆ, conforms to the Propositions 1 and 2.
I show that ψˆ is consistent with a noisy job ladder form of job-to-job mobility.
A worker is more likely to move to a job with an employer paying a higher log
wage premium than his current employer. Second, the data exhibit spatial cor-
relation in ψˆ at the level of the Census block, consistent with contagious search
when social interactions occur among residential neighbors.
Having established these results, I proceed to estimate the offer function us-
ing data on workers who make direct job-to-job transitions. The following dis-
cussion describes the econometric model for the offer function. In what follows,
I completely specify the wage and offer function, calibrate the referral network,
W, and describe my identification strategy. I conclude by describing the full
econometric model that accounts for sample selection associated with the job
search model.
2.3.1 Econometric Model
I make several assumptions to facilitate bringing the model to the data. Recall
that observed earnings are denoted by yit, and specify the earnings determina-
tion process so that
yit = γei,tpJ(i,t) (2.6)
ln yit = ln γ + ln ei,t + ln pJ(i,t). (2.7)
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J(i, t)= j where j is the employer of i at time t. Human capital depends on ob-
servable time-varying inputs, Xit and observable and potentially unobservable
correlates of ability, θi, so that
eit = exp(Xitβ + θi).
Since ψ j = ln p j the final expression for log earnings is:
ln yit = α + Xitβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + εit. (2.8)
The model allows arbitrary heterogeneity in the formal and informal offer dis-
tributions:
fit(ψ) = agit(ψ) + (1 − a)hit(ψ). (2.9)
I assume that this heterogeneity is fully captured by observable worker char-
acteristics, Zi, the vector describing i′s referral network, wi, and the log wage
premia held by workers at the time of the transition. The latter quantity is the
data analogue to Ψ(t), denoted Ψt, where the ith entry is ψJ(i,t), the log wage pre-
mium paid by employer j = J(i, t). The offer distribution is:
f (ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt) = ag(ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt) + (1 − a)h(ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt). (2.10)
It is a simple formality to express a realized offer, ψ∗i,t in terms of the means of the
formal and informal distributions, g and h, and deviations from those means.
ψ∗i,t = a
(
Eg(ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt)) + ηgi,t
)
+ (1 − a)(Eh(ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt) + ηhi,t) (2.11)
= aEg(ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt) + (1 − a)Eh(ψ|Zi,wi,Ψt) + ηi,t, (2.12)
where ηi,t = aη
g
i,t + (1 − a)ηhi,t. Restrictions on the sources of observable variation
and the error processes clarify the essential identification problem and provide
a template for implementing the model empirically. The model specifies the
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mean of the informal offer distribution in equation (2.2), which is implemented
empirically as:
Eh(ψ|wi,Ψt) = (wi)TΨt.
Furthermore, the expected offer from formal search is conditionally indepen-
dent of the social network and the assignments of other workers to jobs. So we
have
E(ψ∗it|Zi,wi,Ψt) = aEg(ψ∗it|Zi)+ (1−a)(wi)TΨt +aE(ηgi,t|wi,Ψt)+ (1−a)E(ηhi,t|Zit). (2.13)
These restrictions imply that the mean offer received through formal channels
depends on individual characteristics but not on the the structure of the referral
network or current set of jobs held by other workers. The mean offer received
through the referral network depends only on network position and the quality
of jobs held by other workers. Also, the expected deviation of the formal offer
from the mean does not depend on individual characteristics, but may be corre-
lated with the social structure. These issues highlight the inherent identification
problems. a is identified if
E(ηi,t|Wi,Ψt) = aE(ηgi,t|wi,Ψt) + (1 − a)E(ηhi,t|Zi) = 0. (2.14)
I abstract here from sample selection generated by the fact that only acceptable
job offers are observed, but return to it below. Assuming all job offers are ob-
served, then as long as there is variation in Eh(ψ∗it|Wi,Ψt) that is uncorrelated
with Eg(ψ∗it|Zit), a is identified under the model. Even when there is sample se-
lection, this variation still facilitates identification as long as there is additional
exogenous variation driving the selection process. Under certain circumstances,
the selection process may itself assist in identification. See (Blume and Durlauf
2005) and (Brock and Durlauf 2001) for details.
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The assumption that E(ηhi,t|Zi) = 0 is reasonable. If the social interaction pro-
cess has been properly specified, then the influence of one’s own characteristics
on the arrival of offers through referral should already be included through wi.
The assumption that E(ηgi,t|wi,Ψt) = 0 may be too strict. It attributes all corre-
lation in outcomes for individuals that are socially proximate according to W
to the effect of referral networks. However, social proximity may be correlated
with factors that influence formal job search. First, workers may sort on the ba-
sis of unobservable characteristics that determine the efficiency of formal search.
There may also be variables determining W that are correlated with search out-
comes. For instance, workers in the same residential neighborhood are closer
according to W, but they also experience correlated search outcomes, for in-
stance because of differential access to transportation.
The empirical challenge is to distinguish between these different causes of
correlation in job offers. I am able to distinguish the effects of spatially cor-
related factors related to the efficiency of job search from the effect of referral
networks because I observe variation in network quality at very high levels of
geographic detail. Workers living in the same neighborhood confront minor
variations in the quality of their referral networks since residential proximity
is a determinant of social proximity. Within a neighborhood, spatially corre-
lated factors affecting search are identical across workers. Therefore, the effects
of referral networks are identified by controlling for unobserved effects driv-
ing search outcomes at the neighborhood level. The network effect is identified
from the within-neighborhood variation in network quality.
I make a parametric assumption that the conditional mean of the formal offer
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distribution is linear in observable worker characteristics.
Eg(ψ∗it|Zi) = ZiΠ˜. (2.15)
This allows for the possibility that some groups of workers have better luck
in finding jobs paying high wage premia, perhaps because of discrimination
against particular groups, or because members of the same demographic group
tend to search for jobs in the same way. In the empirical work, I check for robsut-
ness of my results to variations in this modeling assumption. The offer function
is therefore given by
ψ∗i,t = ZiΠ + γ(w
i)TΨt + ηi,t, (2.16)
where γ = (1 − a) and Π = aΠ˜.
Definition of the Reference Group
Empirical implementation requires a definition of the referral network. I as-
sume that W puts equal weight on all people residing on the same block, and
no weight elsewhere. That is, (wi)TΨt = ψ¯b(i)t where b(i) indicates the block of
residence for worker i, and ψ¯b(i)t is the average wage premium in jobs held by
workers at time t.
ψ∗i,t = ZiΠ + γψ¯b(i)t + ηi,t. (2.17)
This definition of W conforms to many existing studies of neighborhood effects
in labor market outcomes (Topa 2001; Weinberg et al. 2004; Bertrand et al. 2000;
Case and Katz 1991; Bayer et al. 2008). Focusing on local residential neighbor-
hoods exploits the variation in the data. At the same time, it is clear that trans-
mission of job information described in the model is by no means restricted to
conversations among people living on the same block. Conley and Topa (2002a)
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demonstrate that correlations in employment status are well explained by occu-
pational distance and racial or ethnic distance and that social distance metrics
combining multiple dimensions of social proximity are appropriate. As in the
analysis by Bayer et al. (2008), as long as it is correct that social interactions of
the type hypothesized here are stronger among near neighbors, estimates based
on this particular calibration put a lower bound on the true extent of referral
network activity.
Alternative calibrations that allow for social distance to depend on race, eth-
nicity, nativity and their interactions are feasible. This flexibility is an appro-
priate response to model uncertainty about social structure. Identification of
referral effects with an arbitrary matrix W using a design similar to the one
in this paper may be possible under extensions of the identification strategy
proposed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), though these will be computationally in-
tensive. Furthermore, resolving model uncertainty about W awaits tools for
separately identifying social interation effects from variation in social network
structure W. Manski (1993) warns that observed data cannot be used to infer
reference group structure, which if true would mean it is not possible to simul-
teneously learn W and the effect of W from the data.
Naturally, proper care must be taken in implementing this empirically to
make sure that ψ¯b(i)t is computed in such a way that the worker’s initial job and
next job are not included, and that only jobs that were already in progress at the
time the worker made his transition are included. I discuss this in detail when
describing the estimation procedure.
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Identification
The task of identifying social interactions in earnings determination is a spe-
cial case of a general identification problem documented by Manski (1993) and
elaborated in Brock and Durlauf (2001). Blume and Durlauf (2005) provide a
consise introduction to this literature with a useful discussion of the kinds of
data and models that can be used to identify social interactions. My paper is
able to make progress in identifying local interactions in job search for two rea-
sons. First, I use the time dimension of the LEHD data to measure the quality
of jobs in a worker’s referral network prior to him changing jobs. The search
model describes a sequential process of interactions that exploits the longitudi-
nal structure of the data. The conditional independence between past and future
job assignments breaks the reflection problem described by Manski (1993). Con-
ley and Udry (2010) also use the time sequencing of information transmission to
identify the effect of social learning by farmers in Ghana about new agricultural
practices.
Second, the large sample size and fine detail of the residential address in-
formation mean that correlated effects driving job search outcomes can be sep-
arately identified from referral network quality under mild assumptions. Fol-
lowing Bayer et al. (2008), I assume all economically plausible factors affecting
formal job search are homogeneous within pre-defined reference groups of ge-
ographically contiguous Census blocks. Referral network effects are then iden-
tified by block-level variation in network quality within these homogeneous
groups. Many economic processes generate spatially or temporally correlated
outcomes from formal search. One particularly problematic process is the resi-
dential sorting of workers in terms of latent characteristics that affect job search.
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Also, neighborhoods differ in their proximity to jobs with particular character-
istics so that workers in those areas have correlated search outcomes simply due
to proximity.
I assume that each of these economic processes generates correlation in
search outcomes for workers living in the same reference group correlation, but
there is no excess correlation at the block level. The economic rationale for this
is as follows: Residential sorting is imperfect. Thinness of the residential real
estate market means that workers can choose the neighborhood in which they
live, but generally not a specific block. Similarly, employers may prefer to hire
workers from a certain part of the city, but it is unlikely that they have strict
preferences for workers from specific blocks within the same neighborhood. Fi-
nally, in urban areas, transportation access is similar for workers residing in the
same neighborhood.
For the empirical work, I use Census block groups as the reference group.
Block groups are a convenient choice for several reasons. They are the lowest
level of geography above the block for which the Census Bureau releases data,
and are structured to collect relatively homogeneous, geographically contigu-
ous blocks that do not cross tract boundaries. Census block groups have an
optimal size of 1, 500 occupants, but there is considerable variance in the num-
ber of people in any particular block group.
To operationalize the model and identifying assumptions, I use a cross sec-
tion of data on workers residing in 30 large MSAs who are observed to make
direct job-to-job transitions. I exploit the longitudinal structure of the work his-
tory data to construct measures of local referral network quality that are prede-
termined at the date of the worker’s own transition. The final specification of
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the offer function is:
ψ∗i = ZiΠ + γψ¯b(i)0 + ζG(b(i)) + ηi. (2.18)
where ψ¯b(i)0 is the within-block average wage premium across all employed
workers whose jobs were already in progress before the quarter in which i
makes a transition, and that remained in progress in the quarter after. ζG(b(i)) is a
reference group effect where G(b(i)) denotes the reference group within which b
belongs.
A Formal Econometric Model with Sample Selection
The observed wage premium distribution is truncated due to the job-ladder be-
havior of workers. Without measurement error or non-pecuniary benefits as-
sociated with employment at a particular firm, an already employed worker
changes jobs only on receipt of an offer for a job with a higher premium. The
wage premia estimated in the first stage show workers will move to jobs with
lower premia. This feature of the data is related to the finding in Nagypal
(2005) that the rate of job-to-job transitions is not consistent with the strong job
ladder model. They are consistent with a modified on-the-job search model
where workers have idiosyncratic non-pecuniary shocks associated with hold-
ing a particular job. A negative shock means that a worker will accept a job with
a lower premium than his current job.
The offer function is
ψ∗i = ZiΠ + γψ¯b(i)0 + ζG(b(i)) + ηi.
The worker’s mobility decision depends on the difference between the new offer
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and the net utility associated with receiving premium their current premium, ψ∗io
v∗i = ψ
∗
i − ψ∗i0,
where
ψ∗io = ψio − φi.
An indicator for whether the move occurs is therefore
Ii = 1(vi > 0).
In which case, the conditional expectation of the observed wage premium dis-
tribution is:
E(ψi|ψi0,Zi, i) = ZiΠ + γψ¯b(i)0 + ζG(b(i)) + E(η|Ii = 1, ψi0,Zi, i).
So unbiased estimation of the offer function requires a correction for selection
by ψ0:
E(η|Ii = 1, ψi0,Zi, i) = E(η|ψ∗i + φi > ψi0)
= E
(
η|η + φi > ψi0 − ZiΠ − γψ¯b(i)0 − ζG(b(i))
)
.
In the empirical work, I estimate the selection correction model above as well
as models that simply control for ψi0 through a linear term:
E(ψi|ψi0,Zi, i) = ZiΠ + γψ¯b(i)0 + ζG(b(i)) + βψi0.
I find that the selection correction procedure has a very minor, statistically in-
significant effect on the estimate of γ. I use variants of the simpler model in the
quantile regressions.
30
2.4 Data
I analyze the model on work histories drawn from the Longitudinal Employer
Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program of the U.S. Census Bureau. The data
that allow me to identify local social interactions are administrative data on the
worker’s Census block of residence from the Statistical Administrative Records
System (StARS). The outcome of interest is the wage premium paid by the firm
to which a worker moves, and the proposed network quality measures are mo-
ments of the distribution of wage premia held by other workers in an individ-
ual’s neighborhood. Data on wage premia come from estimates of the Abowd-
Kramarz-Margolis (AKM) log earnings decomposition (Abowd et al. 1999). The
final analysis sample includes workers aged 18-70 who resided in one of 30 large
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) during 2002-2003 with information on the
wage premia for any job they held in that two year period. A complete list of
MSAs included in this paper is included in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: List of Metropolitan Statistical Areas Used
MSA Pop. 2000 Pop. Pop.
Rank Growth
2003 2000-08
Austin-Round Rock, TX 1, 249, 763 38 0.322
Baltimore-Towson, MD 2, 552, 994 19 0.045
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 1, 330, 448 37 0.279
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 9, 098, 316 3 0.052
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 5, 161, 544 5 0.221
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 4, 715, 407 8 0.215
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 1, 525, 104 34 0.125
Jacksonville, FL 1, 122, 750 42 0.170
Kansas City, MO-KS 1, 836, 038 27 0.090
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 12, 365, 627 2 0.041
Louisville-Jefferson County, KY-IN 1, 161, 975 43 0.071
continued on next page
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
MSA Pop. 2000 Pop. Pop.
Rank Growth
2003 2000-08
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 5, 007, 564 6 0.081
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 1, 500, 741 36 0.032
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 2, 968, 806 16 0.088
Oklahoma City, OK 1, 095, 421 47 0.101
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 1, 644, 561 29 0.249
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 5, 687, 147 4 0.027
PA-NJ-DE-MD
Pittsburgh, PA 2, 431, 087 21 −0.032
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1, 927, 881 25 0.145
Richmond, VA 1, 096, 957 46 0.117
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 3, 254, 821 13 0.265
Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville, CA 1, 796, 857 26 0.174
San Antonio, TX 1, 711, 703 28 0.187
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 2, 813, 833 17 0.067
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 4, 123, 740 12 0.037
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1, 735, 819 30 0.048
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 3, 043, 878 15 0.099
St. Louis, MO-IL 2, 698, 687 18 0.044
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2, 395, 997 20 0.141
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, 1, 576, 370 32 0.052
VA-NC
The LEHD data are built around the longitudinal employer-employee links
represented by state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records which con-
stitute the job frame. UI records cover approximately 98% of wage and salary
payments in private sector non-farm jobs. The LEHD infrastructure makes use
of the unique individual and employer identifiers from this system to track
workers over time as they move from job to job, and to identify which workers
share an employer. These data are augmented with demographic characteris-
tics through administrative record and statistical links as well as to employer
characteristics, including employer size, industry, and ownership type. For a
complete description of these data, see Abowd et al. (2009).
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Data on place of residence come from the StARS database. StARS is a Cen-
sus Bureau program originally designed to pimprove intercensal population es-
timates as well as refresh its household sampling frame. As part of this mission,
it incorporates administrative data from the IRS, HUD, Medicare, Indian Health
Service and the Selective Service to update information on residential geogra-
phy once a year. Once geocoded, these data provide information on place of
residence down to Census Block. Geocodes of this precision are available for
at least 90% of all LEHD workers who appear in one of the 30 sample MSAs
during 2002-2003.
To measure employer specific wage premia, I use estimates from a decompo-
sition of log earnings into components associated with individual and employer
heterogeneity. This decomposition as applied to matched employer-employee
data was first introducted by Abowd et al. (1999) as a means of correcting bi-
ases in the estimation of industry and other more aggregated types of wage
premia. The Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis (AKM) decomposition is an estimate of
the model
lnY = Xβ + Dθ + Fψ + ε. (2.19)
Here, this model is estimated on the set of all LEHD work histories for work-
ers aged 18-70. Y is a vector of annualized earnings on the dominant job, and ε
is a statistical residual. D and F are design matrices of the worker and employer
effects. X is a matrix of time-varying controls consisting of a quartic in experi-
ence, year effects, and the exact within-year pattern of positive earnings. All of
these measures are interacted with sex. The estimates used in this paper were
conducted as part of the Human Capital Estimates Project within LEHD accord-
ing to the estimation procedure described in Abowd et al. (2002; 2003). This
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model is estimated on observations from 30 states between 1990-2003, covering
660 million wage records for 190 million workers and 10 million employers.
The job history information for workers includes information on transitions
between dominant jobs. A dominant jobs in a given year is the one on which
the worker had the most earnings in that year. For each dominant job, I merge
the estimated employer-specific wage premium, ψ. Then for all workers who
experience a job transition between 2002-2003, I identify the precise quarter
of that transition. A worker can have one of three possible types of transiton:
out-of-sample to employment, employment to out-of-sample, and employer-to-
employer. This paper focuses on employer-to-employer transitions. For out-of-
sample to employment transitions, the date is the quarter in which the worker
first has earnings with the new dominant employer. For employment to out-of-
sample, the transition quarter is the last quarter with positive earnings reported
from the dominant employer. Dominant job to dominant job transitions may oc-
cur annually given the definition of dominant employment. I refine the date of
transition by finding the first quarter in which earnings with the new dominant
employer exceed earnings with the old dominant employer.
The network quality measures are moments of the wage premium distribu-
tion for workers in one’s residential neighborhood. According to the contagion
model, the offer distribution depends on the distribution of jobs currently in
progress among one’s neighbors. To capture this, I measure network quality at
the beginning of the quarter in which one’s job transition occurs. The network
quality measures are the means and variances of ψ j for all workers residing in
the relevant block, block group, or tract and who were employed the full quar-
ter.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Full Sample Job Changers Job Changers*
White 0.6572 0.6280 0.6220
Black 0.1151 0.1220 0.1205
Hispanic Origin 0.1167 0.1369 0.1400
Male 0.5098 0.4985 0.4979
Born in U.S. 0.8098 0.8098 0.8026
Age in 2002 40.5456 35.05848 34.9561
same county 0.9765
same tract 0.8731
same block group 0.8670
same block 0.8595
Any transition 0.3116
Transition to new job 0.0351 1 1
Transition out of sample 0.2634
N 25, 689, 739 899, 147 816, 138
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as for the
subsample of workers involved in a job-to-job transition. An observation in the
sample is a worker from the LEHD infrastructure with positive earnings in at
least one quarter of 2002-2003 who could be matched to a consistent block of
residence in 2002-2003. For the urban workers that are the focus of the paper,
this selection rule has little effect: over 95% of workers have consistent data on
block of residence in both years. I require the recorded block of residence be in
the same MSA in both years; that is, this analysis is for the group of workers who
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do not move between MSAs during the sample period. I have recorded whether
the worker experienced any kind of job transition. The second column in table
2.2 presents statistics for the subsample of workers who experienced a transition
from one employer to another employer without an observed intervening spell
out of the sample. In this sample of urban workers, The demographic character-
istics are consistent with other published sources on labor force demographics.
The sample of movers is marginally less white, more hispanic, and substantially
younger, all of which are expected.
Thirty-one percent of workers experience any kind of job transition during
the sample. For each worker meeting the inclusion criteria, I record the first
observed job transition. Just 3.5% of workers experience a transition between
dominant employers that involves no gap in the earnings history. This is signif-
icantly lower than would be expected from the reported rate of job-to-job transi-
tions in other sources (Bjelland et al. 2008). However, this study considers tran-
sitions between domininant employers, where dominance is defined in terms
of annual earnings. When a worker moves from one long-term employer to the
next, it is picked up by this definition. However, many cases where a worker
holds a short-term job between dominant employers will not be picked up us-
ing my definition. Bjelland et al. (2008), using a different definition of ‘main job’,
find that roughly 31% of all transitions from jobs with tenure greater than one
year are to jobs that last only 2-3 quarters. This could mean that as many as 12%
of workers who appear to make a transition out of sample are actually transi-
tioning into temporary jobs. This means that my sample of job-to-job transitions
is more properly interpreted as a sample of immediate transitions from one rel-
atively long-term dominant job to another. Given the objective of the study, this
is the correct set of transitions to focus on. In transitions from one long-term job
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to the next, it is more likely that the on-the-job search story will be accurate.
A worker who takes a stop-gap job in between long term employers is perhaps
more likely to have separated from the previous employer for other reasons or
adopting a different kind of search strategy.
Table 2.2 also provides evidence in support of the identifying assumption
that residential sorting operates at a higher level of geography than the indi-
vidual block. I observe workers who move within the city over the two year
period. 98% of workers in this sample remain in the same county, 87% remain
in the same tract, and 86% remain in the same block. These categories are not
exclusive, so the 13% of tract movers are also counted as block movers. Hence,
the vast majority of workers who move, move to a new block group or tract,
indicating that mobility decisions are not made on the basis of block-level char-
acteristics.
2.5 Stylized Facts
I first provide evidence that the estimated distribution of ψ conforms to two
major predictions of the job search model with contagious job information. In
this section, I show that workers are more likely to move to jobs better than
the one they currently have. Furthermore, the distributions of wage premia on
destination jobs conditional on the premium in the origin job are strictly ranked
in the sense of stochastic dominance. This is the first evidence that there is any
mobility-related structure to ψ when estimated from the AKM decomposition.
I next show evidence of spatial correlation in the wage-premia held by work-
ers. I compute non-parametric estimates of the spatial autocorrelation function
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for block- and tract-level averages of log earnings and the components from the
AKM decomposition. These reveal positive spatial autocorrelation in estimated
wage premia.
These results should allay concern about a potential objection to the model.
The empirical method is a two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage con-
sists of estimating the empirical wage premia, ψ, from the AKM decomposition,
and the second stage the estimation of the realized offer distribution from data
on workers making direct dominant job transitions. This procedure is consistent
under the assumption that the errors in the earnings equation are not correlated
with errors in the job mobility process. This exogenous mobility assumption
is a feature of the extended on-the-job search model developed in this paper.
It is nevertheless a strict one. That the estimated wage premia conform to the
stylized predictions of the model means that assumption may not be too strong.
2.5.1 Evidence of a job ladder
Table 2.3 shows the fraction of workers that move to a job at the same decile,
or a higher decile of the empirical ψ distribution than their current job. This
probability is always strictly above 0.58, and significantly higher for workers
starting from jobs with log wage premia in the lowest deciles. This evidence is
consistent with the job ladder prediction of the basic search model developed
above. Additional details on the nature of the job ladder evidence in these data
appear in the corresponding figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 plots the cumulative
frequency of destination wage premia for all job transitions stratified by decile
of the origin job wage premium. The plots show decile-to-decile transitions, but
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Table 2.3: Unconditional Transition Probabilities
Origin ψ-decile Pr(ψd1 >= ψ
d
0)
ψd0
1 1
2 0.94
3 0.85
4 0.79
5 0.73
6 0.73
7 0.69
8 0.61
9 0.58
10 0.59
the same results hold when looking at more detailed quantiles. First, note that
there is a clear first-order stochastic dominance relationship among the condi-
tional distributions. Workers starting from jobs with higher wage premia are
more likely to move to jobs with better premia. Second, for each conditional
distribution, the probability of moving to a job with the same or a higher pre-
mium is always strictly higher than the probability of moving to a job with a
lower premium.
Figure 2.2 plots the transition matrix between deciles of the wage premium
distribution. Each ribbon shows, for workers whose initial wage premium fell
in a certain decile, the fraction of transitions to jobs in each decile of the wage
premium distribution. The saddle shape indicates that workers tend to move to
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative probability of transition to each decile of the wage
premium (ψ) distribution, by decile of origin
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Figure 2.2: Probability of transition to each decile of the wage premium (ψ)
distribution, by decile of origin
jobs similar to, or better than the jobs they already have. The conditional densi-
ties are all peaked at the origin decile. This suggests that a mass of transitions
are to jobs in the same decile. This is not a feature of the basic on-the-job search
model. It instead suggests a relationship between the current job and the offer
distribution. This will be the case when there is worker-level heterogeneity of
any kind in the offer distribution. If, for instance, native workers tend to find
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jobs with better wage premia, this will show up in the unconditional densities
plotted here as correlation between current and future offers.
2.5.2 Evidence of spatial correlation in ψ
The data must also exhibit correlation in wage premia between workers along
the dimensions of social interaction that I can measure. If there is no spatial cor-
relation in ψ at the Census block level, then the model can not be valid, either
because social interactions do not function in the manner assumed in the model,
or because social interactions are not strong at the block level. To evaluate this
implication of the model, I compute the spatial autocorrelation function for each
of the components of earnings from the AKM decomposition, both as tract-level
and block-level means. In addition, I estimate the amount of clustering that ap-
pears in the data at the tract- and block-level as the amount of variation in the
data that can be explained with tract- or block-level effects. Both measures pro-
vide evidence of spatial correlation in ψ for close neighbors. To my knowledge,
these are the first estimates of their kind using matched employer-employee
data for the U.S. Furthermore, the spatial autocorrelation estimates are the first
of their kind to be estimated on earnings data at high spatial resolution.
Estimates of the spatial autocorrelation function
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 plot averages of the estimated spatial autocorrelation func-
tion in each MSA for tract- and block-level means of log earnings, the estimated
person effect θ, the estimated wage premium ψ, and the residual from the AKM
decomposition, ε. The discussion in this section closely follows Conley and
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Figure 2.3: Spatial Autocorrelation Function: tract-level means
Topa (2002a) from which the method for this analysis was derived. The core
statistical model is one in which random variable xi is associated with a spa-
tial coordinate, si. The spatial process generating the data is one in which the
correlation between xi and x j depends only on the distance between si and s j.
corr(xi,x j) = f (||si − s j||) (2.20)
This assumes that the correlations do not depend either on the precise loca-
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Figure 2.4: Spatial Autocorrelation Function: block-level means
tions in space of these random variables, nor the direction of the vector between
them. I estimate the spatial autocovariance function at distance δ, f (δ), non-
parametrically by
fˆ (δ) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
i′=1
φ
[ |δ − Aii′ |
σ
] (
Xi − X¯
) (
X j − X¯
)
(2.21)
where Aii′ is the distance between i and i′. φ() denotes the standard normal
kernel. The spatial autocovariance function is estimated as the kernel-weighted
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average of the products of demeaned observations. To convert this to the spatial
autocorrelation, one must divide the resulting estimate by relevant product of
standard deviations. With the normal kernel, this is just the sample variance.
I implement this estimator for tract-level and block-level means of all earn-
ings and the components of the AKM decomposition. I compute fˆ (δ) at dis-
tances from 0 to 5 miles at half-mile gridpoints. Aii′ is measured as the great-
circle distance between internal points of the block or tract. For the block level
estimates, the bandwidth parameter, σ, is set to 0.5. For the tract level esti-
mates, it is set at 0.7. Since the computation scales in the square of the number
of observations, for the block level calculation some simplification is required.
I randomly sample block pairs at the rate of 1/100. For a hypothetical MSA
with 5, 000 blocks, which would be a fairly small one for this study, this means
the spatial autocorrelation function is estimated from approximately 125, 000
unique data points. To satisfy the disclosure avoidance restrictions required to
publish these results, each point in the figures represents the unweighted aver-
age of the estimated fˆ (δ) across 30 MSAs. There is some variation between the
MSA-level estimates, but not enough to change the qualitative features of the
plot. These plots are representative of most of the individual MSAs.
Both figures clearly show positive spatial autocorrelation in the tract- and
block-level means of earnings, θ, and ψ. The main point to take away is that spa-
tial correlation in the estimated wage premia exist of workers in nearby blocks.
This is consistent with the social interactions model of this paper. To be clear,
there are also many other models that could generate these correlation patterns.
The key challenge given the stylized fact is to identify the effect of social interac-
tions in wage premia separately from other spatially correlated influences that
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could produce the result.
These results contain a wealth of interesting information beyond the analysis
in this paper. I mention just two points briefly. First, the block-level estimates
show no spatial autocorrelation in the block level average residual. This is con-
sistent with the model of the paper, in that it suggests that whatever process
puts people in a particular block is not correlated with the earnings residual.
Second, these plots give evidence on the relationship between the spatial cor-
relation in earnings and sorting on unobservables. The spatial correlation in
earnings is mirrored almost exactly by the spatial correlation in estimated per-
son effect, which captures the effect on earnings of unobserved and observed
non-time-varying characteristics. These results confirm the findings of Combes,
Duranton and Gobillon (2008) that sorting on observable and unobservable hu-
man capital characteristics explain a large amount of the spatial wage distribu-
tion in cities.
Estimates of block-level clustering
Neighborhood effect regression provides an alternative way to measure the ex-
tent to which workers are clustered with respect to the components of earnings.
I present the results for tract- and block-level sorting on earnings, and the com-
ponents of earnings estimated from the AKM decomposition. These results are
an informative complement to the spatial autocorrelation results in the previ-
ous section. The results here estimate the amount of clustering within blocks,
whereas the previous estimates showed the amount of spatial correlation be-
tween block-level averages. Following Ioannides (2004), Let k index neighbor-
hoods, defined potentially as blocks, block groups, or tracts. Consider the R2
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Table 2.4: Sorting by log earnings and components from the AKM decom-
position, R2 method.
Log Earnings θ ψ ε
tr
ac
t Mean 0.168 0.100 0.036 0.009
Stan. dev. 0.0374 0.0244 0.0170 0.0030
bl
oc
k Mean 0.291 0.203 0.119 0.082
Stan. dev. 0.0357 0.0271 0.0171 0.0127
Num. of MSAs 30
Num. of Obs. 14, 855, 153
from the linear model
yi = ηK(i) + ei, (2.22)
where e is an i.i.d. error measuring the dispersion in yi around its neighborhood-
level mean. The R2 measure is intuitively a measure of neighborhood clustering
or sorting on y (Kremer and Maskin 1996; Kremer 1997). If there is no cluster-
ing by neighborhood, then the distribution of earnings within neighborhoods
is just an exact copy of the city-wide distribution and the neighborhood effects
shouldn’t explain anything. If there is perfect sorting, so that each neighbor-
hood distribution is point mass at one earnings level, then the neighborhood
effects will explain everything.
For this paper, the important question is whether there is clustering within
blocks in terms of the estimated wage premia, ψ. Table 2.4 presents evidence that
this is the case. Each entry in the table is the simple average across the 30 MSAs
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of R2 from estimating the model in equation 2.22 for a particular combination of
geographic resolution (block or tract) and variable of interest (earnings, θ,ψ or
ε). On average, block-level effects explain about 12% of the variation in wage
premia. Tract effects explain 4%.
(Davidoff 2005) shows that these estimates are biased downward if earnings
are measured with error, but are potentially biased upward by the mechanical
relationship between R2 and the number of variables in the model. These mod-
els are estimated on very large samples, so adjustments of R2 for the number
of blocks or tracts do not change the results. Measurement error is a potential
problem, but the administrative earnings data used in this paper are generally
more accurate than the self-reports of earnings in survey data.
The results for earnings are of independent interest. The block specification
explains 29% of variation in measured earnings in the average MSA. The tract
specification explains 18%. These results confirm the overall low levels of resi-
dential sorting with respect to earnings, or conversely, the high levels of mixing.
Interestingly, the results presented here for blocks are very close to the results
presented by Ioannides (2004) for tract-level estimates of sorting by household
income from the American Housing Survey Metropolitan Sample. The most
likely source of the discrepency is the difference in variables being measured.
Families are more likely to sort by household than individual income.
2.6 Estimation Results
Having established that the estimated wage premia, ψ, are consistent with the
broad predictions of the model, I now use these data to estimate the influence
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of local referral network quality on job search outcomes. Table 2.5 collects the
results from estimating linear and quantile regression specifications of the form
ψi = ZiΠ + βψ0i + γψ¯b(i)0 + ϕψ¯G(b(i)) + ζG(b(i)) + νi (2.23)
Primary interest lies with estimates of the parameter γ, which measures the
effect of local interactions on job offers. Zi is a vector of individual characteristics
including age and its square, indicators for whether the worker is white or not,
hispanic or not, and male or not, as well as the estimated person effect, θ from
the first-stage. The notation b(i) indicates the Census block in which i resides.
ψ¯b(i)0 is the within-block average wage premium across all employed workers
whose jobs were already in progress before the quarter in which i makes a tran-
sition, and that remained in progress in the quarter after. ψ0i is the wage pre-
mium of the employer from which i transitions. ζG(b(i)) is a reference group effect
where the notation G(b(i)) indicates the reference group of contiguous blocks
containing b(i). The reference group in these estimates is the Cenus block group.
The key result is in the contrast between the baseline specification, which
does not control for reference group correlations in outcomes, and the two spec-
ifications that do. Inference in the conditional mean regressions is based on
heteroscedasticty-corrected standard errors that have been clustered at the MSA
level1. The baseline model presented in the first column of table 2.5 shows the
raw correlation between ψ¯b(i)0 and ψi, the premium on the job to which i makes a
transition, controlling for the premium on the origin job and observable charac-
teristics that may influence formal search. The point estimate on γ in the base-
1This specification is very conservative. Under the empirical model, clustering at the county
or tract level would be appropriate. As Cameron et al. (2008) point out, asymptotic tests based
on data with around 30 or fewer clusters may over-reject. Even with standard errors cluster
on 30 MSAs, the point estimates of interest are significantly different from zero in all cases.
Alternative specifications that cluster on county or tract, which are available upon request, do
not alter the qualitative results.
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line model of 0.33 is on the same order of magnitude as the point estimate of β.
In this specification, though, γ is absorbing any unobserved correlates of formal
job search that aren’t included in the model.
The social interaction parameter, γ, is identified in the model with reference
group controls presented in the fourth column of table 2.5. The point estimate
is γˆ = 0.10 ± 0.01, and is statistically significant. To interpret the point estimate
in terms of the model, this means that 10% of job offers arrive through refer-
rals. This is in line with Ioannides and Loury’s (2004) analysis of referral use by
workers in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which shows that 8.5 percent
of employed workers report using referrals to search for work.
The other columns in table 2.5 present alternative estimates of γ based on a
contrast between ψ¯b(i)0 and ψ¯G(b(i)). The point estimates are nearly identical, and I
conclude that the coefficient on the group-level average log wage premium has
absorbed all of the unobserved correlation in outcomes. Because of its compu-
tational simplicity, I use this contrast to estimate the selection correction model
as well as the quantile regressions.
As a check for robustness of my estimate of the social intaction parameter γ,
I estimate the full econometric model of job-to-job mobility described in section
2.3.1. It allows for sample selection driven by the fact that only workers who
receive sufficiently attractive offers change jobs. The attractiveness of a job offer
depends on the wage premium of one’s current job, ψ0. Following the theoretical
model, ψ0 is excluded from the offer function, but does appear in the selection
equation. I estimate the selection correction model using data on all employed
workers at risk to change jobs in 2002 quarter 4. The results are presented in
table 2.6. As expected, in the selection equation, the log wage premium on the
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Table 2.6: Selection Correction Model Estimates
Premium on next job, ψ Offer Selection
Selection on job-to-job move Function Equation
Initial premium: ψ0 (β) −0.58∗
(.017)
Mean premium in block: ψ¯block (γ) 0.11∗ 0.10∗
(.023) (.020)
Mean premium in block group: ψ¯bg (φ) 0.64∗ 0.32∗
(.060) (.069)
λ (Inv. Mills) 0.48∗
(.058)
ρ 0.79
σ 0.61
N 1, 330, 475
χ2(9) 683.23
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered on 30 MSAs. * entries have
p-value < 0.025. Both models include all controls from Table 2.5.
worker’s initial job ψ0 has a strong negative effect on the probability of a job-to-
job move. Workers living on blocks with better than average network quality
for their neighborhood are also more likely to make a job-to-job transition. The
point estimate on the social interaction parameter in the selection correction
model is γˆ = 0.11 ± 0.02.
One objection to my research design is that the local referral interactions I
model are most relevant to certain kinds of jobs, and are more likely to be used
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneous Referral Effects
Premium on next job, ψ
Mean premium in block: ψ¯block 0.10∗ 0.17∗
(.012) (.023)
Born in U.S.×ψ¯block −0.09∗
(.021)
block group controls yes yes
N 815, 899 815, 889
R2 0.2711 0.2712
Standard errors are clustered on 30 MSAs. * entries have p-value
< 0.025. Models include controls from Table 2.5.
by certain groups of workers. Previous research indicates that the use and effi-
ciency of referrals differ considerably by demographic group. Furthermore, the
kinds of jobs that are shared among residential neighbors are more likely to be
jobs with relatively little specific skill requirements. To check whether my re-
sults are sensitive to heterogeneity in the effect of referrals, I estimate the model
with block group controls and allowing for the use of referrals to be different for
native workers and non-native workers. The results, reported in table 2.7, show
that non-native workers have γˆ = 0.17 ± 0.02, which is a 70% increase over the
pooled estimate. This finding is consistent with other work finding that immi-
grants are more likely to find jobs by referral than their native counterparts.
Observable demographic characteristics explain relatively little of the varia-
tion in the data. The signs on the coefficients associated with demographic and
human capital characteristics have the same sign as would be expected in a Min-
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cerian wage regression, but with only marginal significance in most cases. All
of these estimates are an order of magnitude smaller than the point estimates
of the social interaction parameter γ, and the effect associated with the initial
job type. This is likely because these human capital effects are implicitly con-
trolled in the first stage when θ and ψ are estimated. Evidence of and absence of
correlation between the estimated wage premia ψ and θ matches evidence doc-
umented in other studies of the AKM decomposition. This result is consistent
with the arrival of information about wage premia being only weakly related
to individual ability, which is in turn consistent with the notion that they are
non-economic rents associated with information frictions in the labor market.
Table 2.8 presents estimates of conditional quantile specifications for the 10th,
25th, 50th, 75thand 90th percentiles of the ψ distribution for job changers. The
quantile regression results confirm the theoretical predictions of propositions 3
and 4. The key result is the pattern in the coefficient estimates associated with
ψ¯b(i)0, ψ¯G(b(i))0 and ψ0.
Let β(q) be the coefficient associated with ψ0 in the conditional regression of
the qth quantile, and define γ(q) similarly. Propositions 3 and 4 predict that for
q < q′, β(q) > β(q′) and γ(q) < γ(q′). In the search model, increasing ψ0 affects
outcomes by increasing the reservation offer that triggers mobility. Intuitively,
increasing ψ0 will have a larger impact on the distribution of acceptable offers
close to the trunaction point than those further away. The estimates clearly show
β(0.1) > β(0.5) > β(0.9). However, γ(0.1) > γ(0.25) = γ(0.5) < γ(0.75) < γ(0.9).
The predicted pattern appears if one considers the estimates associated with the
neighborhood (block–group) level mean, ψ¯G(b(i))0. It is also impossible to reject
the hypothesis that γ(0.1) = γ(0.25) = γ(0.5), so the data weakly support the
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proposition.
2.7 Conclusion
I find stong evidence of local social interactions in the transmission of infor-
mation about employer specific wage premia. Workers whose neighbors have
jobs paying higher wage premia are more likely to experience a job transition,
and when they do, are more likely to move to a job with a better premium. I
estimate this effect using variation in network quality among workers who re-
side in the same Census block group. This is identified as a social interaction
effect assuming that workers cannot sort by block within block group, and that
factors that cause search outcomes to be spatially correlated are homogeneous
within block groups. The best estimate from the model indicates that 10% of a
worker’s job offers come from referrals. This is consistent with figures reported
by other authors on the extent of referral use. These are the first results on di-
rect local interactions in earnings outcomes in the context of a job search model.
They complement existing work on local interactions in employment status and
hours of work. This is also an important extension of the identification strategy
of Bayer et al. (2008), which uses a similar identification strategy to establish
local interactions in job-finding.
To motivate and structure the empirical work, I construct a model of job
search augmented to allow for transmission of job information through referral
network contacts. In addition to the main result, I estimate mean and quantile
regression models to test the models predictions. I show that the distribution of
wage premia across workers who make job-to-job moves responds to variation
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in referral network quality in a manner consistent with this model.
The model also predicts that workers who switch jobs tend to move into jobs
with higher wage premia than their current job, and that there will be correla-
tion in the wage premia held by workers who are socially connected to each
other. I show that the log wage premia estimated from matched employer-
employee data exhibit both of these properties. This is the first evidence of
mobility-related structure in employer wage premia estimated from matched
employer-employee data. I also estimate the spatial correlation structure of
earnings, employer-specific wage premia, and worker ability. The block-level
analysis in this paper is among the most geographically detailed studies of sort-
ing by earnings, human capital, and employer characteristics in U.S. cities and
is relevant to those interested in residential sorting by earnings, human capital
characteristics, and employer characteristics in urban labor markets.
My findings add to a growing body of evidence on the importance of so-
cial interactions for job search and labor market outcomes. The data support
a model in which social interactions function to help exchange information
about particularly attractive job opportunities among socially connected work-
ers. This has implications for the distribution of earnings, and also for the ef-
ficiency of labor market matching. The details of these distributional and effi-
ciency impacts are important areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
FREE TO MOVE? A NETWORK ANALYTIC APPROACH FOR LEARNING
THE LIMITS TO JOB MOBILITY
3.1 Introduction
There is a network of connections between employers and employees that
evolves over time as people move from job to job. This realized mobility net-
work connects workers in the economy with every employer with whom they
have held a job. The advent of population-level matched employer-employee
data means it is possible to document the realized mobility network empirically
(Abowd et al. 2002). I argue that the structure of this network contains informa-
tion of interest to labor economists. First, it provides a set of facts that should
be respected in modeling job mobility. Second, it suggests a novel approach to
identifying labor market clusters, whether they be sectoral, geographic, or dis-
criminatory, in terms of partitioning the network where mobility is relatively
weak. In this paper, I document several of the stylized facts of the realized
mobility network in data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
In terms of degree distribution, clustering coefficient, edge-to-node ratios, and
clustering, the realized mobility network is strikingly similar to other, unrelated
networks that have been widely studied outside of economics. This is fortunate,
because it means that it may be possible to use existing reduced form models
of network formation to inform structural models of job mobility. I then go on
to show that partitioning this network on the basis of structure alone into rela-
tively tightly connected groups of nodes reveals labor market clusters that are
differentiated along race, gender, and income. It follows that these tools may be
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quite powerful for the unsupervised detection of labor market clusters.
Labor economics has ignored the relational structure of the realized mobilty
network, at least in empirical work, focusing instead on the role of agent at-
tributes in determining labor market outcomes. Yet, for many basic questions,
such as wage determination, this may be misguided. This paper goes to an op-
posite extreme by focusing completely on network structure and ignoring agent
attributes. In so doing, it asks whether the network structure alone reveals eco-
nomically salient facts about the labor market. A simple thought experiment
reveals why this is so. Suppose we have to predict the wages of two identical
workers about whom we know nothing of job history. The usual model might
predict that each worker’s wage is an independent draw from some wage dis-
tribution, conditional on human capital and demographic characteristics. Now,
suppose we also know that these two workers ever worked for the same em-
ployer. Intuitively, this knowledge should also condition our forecast of the
wage. Alternatively, what if we know they never worked for the same em-
ployer, but they both worked with people who themselves worked together?
This ‘short path’ between work histories may be related to wage outcomes if,
for instance, workers with similar histories tend to have similar earnings.
The analysis carried out here is for a sample of heads and spouses in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1987 and 1997. The set of
’pseudo-employers’ from this data set is defined as the set of unique industry-
occupation pairs that appear in the sample. The analysis of the PSID illus-
trates the range of techniques, and character of results that might be expected
in matched data. Characterizing the topology of the realized mobility network
in the PSID is the first contribution of this paper. Because the realized mobility
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network is not a proper social network the particular statistics used to describe
the network topoplogy do not have clear economic interpretations. However,
these statistics reveal information about the nature of the process through which
the network was formed. For instance, it appears that the connections between
workers based on work histories are more random than the connections be-
tween firms based on shared employment. The characterization of the network
topology thus provides a handful of stylized facts that can be used in modelling
labor market dynamics as a network formation process.
The second contribution of the paper is an application to the detection of la-
bor market clusters of a method for detecting the ‘community structure’ of the
realized mobility network. Mobility may be restricted between different sets of
jobs for a variety of reasons. Theories of geographic immobililty, occupation- or
industry-specific human capital, and market segmenation all predict that obser-
vationally similar workers may have differing propensities to enter a particular
job based on their prior employment history. In light of this, we would expect
the realized mobility network to exhibit some more dense clustering amongst
jobs that tend to be more closely related, with relatively fewer connections be-
tween those densely connected groups.
In the literature on complex networks, identifying these dense subgraphs is
called a community structure problem. I first apply a method developed by
Girvan and Newman (2002) to find community structure in the realized mobil-
ity network. The resulting partition of workers into different market clusters
shows that mobility restrictions are correlated with demographic, gender and
income differentials, which is consistent with existing models. I then develop
and implement a second method for finding labor market segments based on
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the principle of maximum likelihood. Using a simple Markov model of job
mobility, I find the maximum likelihood partition of pseudo-employers. Like
the first method, I find that this method delivers clusters that are correlated
with observable and unobservable determinants of earnings. Altoghether, these
findings support the idea that there is interesting and exploitable labor market
information in the structure of the realized mobility network.
3.2 The Realized Mobility Network
This paper works with a convenient representation of matched employer-
employee data called the realized mobility network. The realized mobility
network connects each worker with every employer she worked for during
the sample. More formally, for each period of the sample we define the re-
alized employment network as a bipartite graph, Gt, with vertex set V(Gt) =
({1, ..., I}, {1, ...,m}) = (I,M) and edge set E(Gt) = {(i,m) ∈ I × M|m = J(i, t)}. The
realized mobility network , G, is defined simply as the network whose vertex
set is V(G) = (I,M) and whose edge set is E(G) = ∪Tt=1E(Gt).
3.2.1 Basic Graph Theory
A graph or network, G is defined by a given set of nodes or vertices, N(G) = {1, ..., n}
and a set of edges, E(G) ⊂ N × N. When the edges are undirected we have
(i, j) ∈ E(G) if and only if ( j, i) ∈ E(G). In this paper, all graphs are undirected, so
the simplified notation i j ∈ E(G) will be used to say that i and j are connected in
G. Note also that the terms graph and network can be used interchangeably; both
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terms refer to the same theoretical construction.
Several alternative representations of G are possible. The adjacency matrix
representation, A, is an n × n matrix whose i jth entry is 1 if i j ∈ E(G) and 0
otherwise. Clearly, the adjacency matrix for an undirected graph is always
symmetric. G can also be represented by the list of its edges, as long as each
vertex in the graph is attached to at least one edge. Finally, the graph can be
characterized by listing, for each vertex i, the neighbors of i in G. We let the set
NG(i) = { j ∈ N : i j ∈ E}. The degree of i is simply the number of its neighbors,
|NG(i)|.
Given i and j, we say that i and j are path-connected if there exists a set of
edges in G connecting i and j.
Given a graph G, its components are the completely connected subsets of its
node set. That is Nˆ ⊂ N is a component of G if for each i and j in Nˆ, i and j are
path connected.
The basic representation of the realized mobility network is as an undirected
bipartite graph. A bipartite graph, B, is a graph with two non-intersecting sets
of vertices with the feature that edges can only link nodes that are in different
sets. In the context of the realized mobility network, one set of nodes represents
the set of workers, and another set of nodes represents their employers. More
formally, we define a bipartite graph, B, as a graph whose node set, N(B) =
(N1,N2) where N1 and N2 form a partition of N and such that i j ∈ E(B)→ i ∈ N1
and j ∈ N2.
In characterizing the realized mobility network, we also want to consider
the set of connections it induces between firms, and between workers. We can
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Figure 3.1: Realized Employment Network: t = 1
think of two workers as being connected if they ever held a job with the same
employer. Likewise, two employers are linked if they ever shared an employee.
These induced unipartite graphs are called the one-mode projections of the re-
alized mobility network. Given bipartite graph B, we may form the one-mode
projection of B onto N1, BN1 , as follows. Let N(BN1) = N1 and let vw ∈ E(BN1) if and
only if there exists j ∈ N2 such that v j ∈ E(G) and w j ∈ E(G). The well-known
game “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon” is as clear an example as you could want of
bipartite graph projection. The object of the game is to trace a path from a given
actor, say Bela Lugosi, to Kevin Bacon where a connection exists between two
actors if they were ever in the same film.1 The underlying network is bipartite,
connecting actors and films where the link means “x appeared in y”. The Kevin
Bacon game is based on the projection of this graph onto the set of actors.
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Figure 3.2: Realized Employment Network: t = 2
Figure 3.3: Realized Employment Network: t = 3
3.2.2 Defining the Realized Mobility Network
The realized mobility network is generated from panel data of the form {i, t,m}
where i ∈ W is the index of a particular worker, t ∈ T is the time period, and
m ∈ M is an identifier of i′s employer at time t. The subsample at a fixed
point in time, t, may be regarded as the set of edges in a bipartite graph, Gt.
1Bela Lugosi is three steps away from Kevin Bacon. See http://oracleofbacon.org/ for de-
tails.
64
Figure 3.4: Realized Mobility Network
Gt is called the realized employment network at time t. The vertex set of Gt,
V(Gt) = (Wt,Mt) where Wt ⊂ W and Mt ⊂ M are the sets of workers and em-
ployers observed in the particular period. An element i j of the edge set E(Gt)
indicates that worker i holds a job with employer m. Given a sample period,
t ∈ {1, ...,T }. the realized mobility network, G, is simply the network formed by
setting V(G) = ∪Tt=1(Wt,Mt) and E(G) = ∪Tt=1E(Gt). Figures (3.1) through (3.4) il-
lustrate the formation of a realized mobility network over three time periods in
the simple setting where the set of workers, W = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, and the set
of employers J = {A, B,C,D}. This simple example shows that while the struc-
ture of Gt is rather sparse at any point in time, G becomes densely connected
very quickly2.
2In general, these data are also matched to Xi, which are are time-invariant characteristics of
the worker such as race and education, Xm, the time-invariant characteristics of the employer,
Zi,t, the time-varying characteristics of the worker, Zm,t, the time-varying characteristics of the
employer, and Yi,m,t which are job-specific characteristics that vary over time such as the wage
and tenure.
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3.3 Related Literature
Sociological analysis starts with the premise that people’s behaviors are medi-
ated by their social environment. Modeling the social environment as a network
of relationships among otherwise independent people can be a fruitful way to
explore the effects of social structure on individual and group behavior (Hol-
land and Leinhardt 1977). Any market transaction forms a connection, even
if only a fleeting one, between the people, firms, and other economic agents
who are parties to it. But while the formalization of social relationships as net-
works has a long history in sociology3, the analysis of economic relationships
as networks is virtually nonexistent. This may be for at least two reasons. First,
although the relational properties of economic exchange are ubiquitous, they
are generally speaking also unobserved in the data. In economic data, we are
generally only ever informed about the specific characteristics of one agent in
a transaction. Second, perhaps relatedly, most economic analysis abstacts away
from the relational aspects of market interactions. These specific relational in-
teractions are regarded as irrelevant in the determination of the market level
phenomena of price, quantity and distribution of resources.
There are very few existing empirical analyses of network structures in eco-
nomic data, and this is the first, to my knowledge, of labor market data. Within
economics, most of the interest in social network analysis has been in devel-
oping theoretical models to explore how social network structures mediate the
transmission and distribution of important economic information. Within la-
bor economics, many papers analyze the effects of employee social networks on
the transmission of information about various job opportunities (Montgomery
3Moreno (1934) is generally credited as the first network analysis of social relations. Wasser-
man and Faust (1994) provides a thorough synthesis and overview of social network methods.
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1991; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004). The empirical analyses associated
with these theoretical models attempt to infer the impact of social network struc-
ture through identification of social interaction effects (Conley and Topa 2002b),
but do not explicitly assess network structure, generally because data on social
relationships are not available.
The analysis of the topology of a realized mobility network has more in com-
mon with the interdisciplinary literature on complex networks developed by
computer scientists, physicists and sociologists. Within that literature, empiri-
cal analyses have been conducted on social networks, information, biological,
and technological networks. None of these have looked at the structure of con-
nections in labor market data, nor explored the possibilities of using these meth-
ods to detect structure in job mobility patterns. However, all of the topological
properties that are considered in this paper are standard fare in the complex
networks literature. The surveys written by Jackson (2005) and Newman (2003)
provide excellent overviews of empirical studies of complex network topolo-
gies.
The problem of detecting community structure has a long history in social
network analysis. It is related to the more general problem of finding partitions
of a graph with various properties. The approach used in this paper was devel-
oped in a pair of papers by and Clauset et al. (2004). Within economics, Copic
et al. (2009) have a recent paper analyzing community structure in a network
formed from data on reference patterns in economics journals. Their approach
is similar to the one used here in that it involves finding the partition that max-
imizes an objective function. In their case, the objective function is a likelihood
function based on an underlying model of the graph formation process, and for
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which they provide a decision-theoretic foundation. Interestingly, the modular-
ity objective function is not equivalent in general to the likelihood function of
Copic et al. (2009).
Community structure in the realized mobility network reveals patterns in
job-to-job transitions suggesting that mobility is more likely between certain
kind of jobs. This perspective is related to labor economics literature on the
mobility of workers across industries and occupations, and to the literature on
labor market segmentation. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) find strong ev-
idence that mobility within occupation is more likely than mobility between
occupations, with similar but weaker results for inter-industry transitions. Both
human capital theories and labor market segmentation theories predict differen-
tial transition rates between different kinds of jobs. The analysis of community
structure in matched employer-employee data provides a method for detecting
where these differential transition rates might lie, without making an a priori
assumption on the nature of the barriers to mobility.
3.4 Data
My sample from the PSID includes all heads and their spouses from 1987-1997.
An individual was in the sample as long as she was in a family that responded
to the survey in both 1987 and in 1997. Individuals who never reported a pri-
mary industry-occupation pair during the sample are omitted, since they do
not contribute a (relevant) vertex to the network. I chose heads and spouses be-
cause the PSID consistently collects their industry and occupation data. Addi-
tional demographic variables incorporated into the analysis below include race
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(white or not), gender, labor income, family income, state of residence, age in
1994, and education. The main sample includes 9,224 individuals who report a
valid industry-occupation pair for at least one year in the sample.
This main PSID sample is recorded as a person-level file which is easily con-
verted to a bipartite adjacency list, and then to a bipartite edgelist. From the
bipartite edgelist, I construct the one-mode projections GW and GM. The topo-
logical characteristics of all three networks are computed as discussed in the
methodology section. To perform the community structure analysis using the
FastCommunity algorithm of Clauset, Newman and Moore, it is also necessary
to extract the components of each graph to be analyzed separately4. In the pro-
jection, GW , there are 410,616 edges connecting the workers in W. Finally, GW
has one large connected component with 7, 425 nodes and 381, 599 edges.
For the mobility analysis, the main sample is further restricted to those in-
dividuals who were over 29 years of age in 1994 and who contribute at least
two years of valid industry and occupation data. The restriction to persons over
age 22 is to reduce the infuence of early career mobility associated with career-
shopping. The number of workers in this subsample is |W | = 7, 515 and the
number of pseudo-employers (unique industry-occupation pairs) is |M| = 6, 943.
In analyzing job-to-job mobility, I focus on a decomposition of the strongly con-
nected component (SCC) in the network over pseudo-employers. A strongly
connected component is one in which it is possible to get from one job to any
other job through a series of directed edges. The strongly connected compo-
nent in the network consists of 5, 103 pseudoemployers. 7, 363 of the total 7, 515
workers are ever employed in one of the pseudoemployers in the SCC. Table
4The SAS and C++ code for the network transformations and calculation of network statis-
tics is available from the author. Code for the FastCommunity algorithm is available from the
webpage of Aaron Clauset, http://www.cs.unm.edu/˜aaron/research/fastmodularity.htm
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Table 3.1: Data Summary
PSID Sample SCC∗ CC∗∗
white 0.690 0.690 0.690
(0.504) (0.505) (0.505)
male 0.512 0.509 0.509
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
number of jobs 4.5 4.5 4.5
(2.66) (2.66) (2.66)
average labor earnings† $19,900 $19,759 $19,860
age 38.83 38.81 35.43
(15.529) (15.675) (12.0951)
Less than HS 0.202 0.202 0.205
(0.4015) (0.4015) (0.4038)
High School 0.330 0.327 0.323
(0.4702) (0.4693) (0.4676)
Some College 0.231 0.231 0.234
(0.4215) (0.4216) (0.4232)
College 0.139 0.0.141 0.139
(0.3464) (0.3479) (0.3458)
Postgraduate 0.070 0.071 0.0952
(0.2554) (0.2569) (0.2935)
Number of Obs. 7,515 7,363 7,425
Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗Employed by a pseudoemployer in the strongly connected component of
the realized mobility network.
∗∗The largest connected component of the realized mobility network.
†Median of average within-sample labor earnings.
3.1 shows that the basic characteristics of the two samples of workers are nearly
identical. These workers initiate 31, 578 unique job spells with different pseu-
doemployers for a total of 51, 066 job-year observations in the SCC.
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3.5 Basic Topology of the Realized Mobility Network in the
PSID
Networks, social or otherwise, are complex when their size and patterns of at-
tachment defy regularity or visual clarity. The development of large network
datasets and the computational power to analyze them has driven a search for
methods to characterize features of interest in complex networks. The three
most commonly reported measures of network topology are the degree distri-
bution, the clustering coefficient, and the average distance between nodes. In
this paper, I focus on these three measures for consistency with the existing lit-
erature and explore whether these properties of the network topology have in-
herent economic interest. In general, they are difficult to interpret individually,
but taken together tell us about the process of network formation.
3.5.1 Degree Distribution
Recall that the degree of a node, i ∈ V(G), which we denote ki, is the num-
ber of neighbors i has in G. That is, ki = |NG(i)|. The degree distribution,
F(k) = Pr(ki ≥ k) is a fundamental concept linking the analysis of complex net-
works to the theory of random graphs. One of the recurrent observations of
complex network research is that social networks have degree distributions that
tend to follow a power law, and that tend to be scale free. This contrasts with
basic models of random network formation, which result in a Poisson (when
formation is static) or exponential degree distribution (when formation is dy-
namic). In this paper, I report whether the observed degree distributions are
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closer to an exponential or a power law distribution based on the quality of the
fit between the theoretical and the empirical distribution. I interpret a roughly
exponential distribution as evidence of randomness in the statistical process by
which the network formed A roughly power law distribution suggests that
there is some non-randomness in the sense that the probability of attachment is
not independent of node degree.
In the realized mobility network, we can calculate the degree distributions
of the worker nodes and the employer nodes separately. The degree distribu-
tion of the worker nodes is therefore a measurement of the distribution of the
number of job changes observed during the sample. The degree distribution of
the employer nodes is a measurement of the number of employment relation-
ships in which a given employer was engaged during the sample. This gives the
curious result that employers that are occupied by a large number of workers
at any time and low turnover are topologically similar to employers with a low
number of workers at any point in time, but high turnover.
In the one-mode projection GW , the degree of i is the number of workers
who worked for the same employer as i at any point in the sample, even if
they did do so at the same time. As in the bipartite graph, the degree will be
influenced by both the number and type of employers of each worker. A worker
making few transitions but working for an employer with either high turnover,
or high employment will have high degree. The distribution of degree in GW
nevertheless captures something about the way work experiences are shared
across the population. The degree of a node m in GM measures the number of
other jobs that were held by workers who also worked for m. This measurement,
too, confounds employer size and employer turnover, but nevertheless indicates
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something about the generality or specificity of the particular job.
3.5.2 Clustering
Measures of clustering are meant to capture the extent to which connections in
the network are transitive; that is, of the extent to which a given node’s neigh-
bors tend to also be neighbors of each other. In the social networking context,
clustering in a graph captures the idea that ’friends of my friends are also my
friends’. In slightly more abstract terms, substantial clustering in the graph
should be reflected in a heightened number of ’triangles’. One statistic that has
developed to capture the extent to which a large graph has this property is the
’clustering coefficient’, C, which is a measure of the mean probability that the
friend of your friend is also your friend. This has been measured both as
C =
3 × # of triangles in graph
# of connected triples
or
Ci =
# of triangles connected to i
# of connected triples centered on i
and then
C =
1
n
∑
i
Ci
Where a ’connected triple’ is a subgraph of three nodes, { j, i, k} in which j
and k are both connected to i, which is called the ’center’ of the triple. Only the
latter measurement is used in this paper.
The concept of clustering does not apply to bipartite graphs, but it is possible
to measure in each of the one-mode projections of the realized mobility network.
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The clustering Ci of any node i in GW is determined as follows. The degree of
the node determines the number of triples centered on i. A triple{ j, i, k} will be
completed in one of two cases: if i, j, k all share the same employer, or if i and j
share a different employer from i and k, but j and k also happen to share a third
employer.
3.5.3 Distance
Finally, the geodesic distance between i and j, di j is the number of edges along
the shortest path between them. The mean geodesic is the sample average over
all nodes.
l =
1
1/2n(n + 1)
∑
i≥ j
di j
The mean geodesic inGW is a measure of how closely linked two workers are
in terms of their employment history. The length of the shortest path between
i and j in GW indicates the minimum number of transitions required to move
from one of i′s employers to one of j′s. Similarly, the length of the shortest path
in GJ between j and k tells us something about the ease of moving from j to k.
Namely, if j and k have distance one, then someone was able to move from j to
k. If they have distance two, then no one moved from j to k, but there is some
intermediate job that connects the two. In some sense, the graph distance is a
measurement of the ease with which a hypothetical worker could hope to make
a transition between two jobs. This is connected to the idea of finding mobility
segments, which I turn to in the next section.
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3.5.4 Results
Statistics summarizing the topology of the bipartite realized mobility network,
G, and its one-mode projections, GW and GM appear in Table 3.2. Statistics on
average degree are reported for both sets of nodes in G. For GW and GM I also
report the clustering coefficient, C, calculated as discussed above. To further
characterize the degree distribution, I also report parameters for either the expo-
nential distribution or power law distribution with the best fit. For comparison,
I have also included statistics on two social networks with similar topological
properties: the network of film stars and the network of coauthorship relation-
ships in physics Newman (2003)
Degree distribution of G
In the bipartite realized mobility network, G, the average degree of the nodes in
W, µW = 2.6, and the average degree of the nodes in M, µM = 4.35. A worker can
only report one primary industry and occupation in each of the six years of the
sample, so there is an upper bound of 6 on the degree of any node w ∈ W. There
is no such limitation on the degree distribution of m ∈ M.
Graphs of the cumulative degree distributions for M and W appear as figures
3.5 and 3.6. The degree distribution of M in is roughly linear for small degrees
when plotted on log-log axes, suggesting a power law degree distribution in
that portion of the support. However, the distribution is also heavily skewed
5Because each link with an end in W must also have an end in M, we necessarily have
µW
M
=
µM
W
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Figure 3.5: Degree distribution of the person nodes in the realized mobility
network in the PSID
Figure 3.6: Degree distribution of the pseudoemplyer nodes in the realized
mobility network in the PSID
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Figure 3.7: Degree distribution of the projection of the realized mobility
network in the PSID sample onto workers
toward the right tail. This shape for a degree distribution is not uncommon
in the literature (Newman 2003). The degree distribution in the set of worker
nodes is better fit as an exponential. It is noteworthy that the functional form
of the degree distributions match those of the corresponding one-mode projec-
tions.
The Projection onto W: GW
Projection onto W produces a graph with a great deal of connectivity. This
graph has 428,848 edges connecting the 9,224 worker nodes. Of these 9,224
nodes, 8,360 are included in one large connected component. The remainder
of the components are singletons (corresponding to workers who had only one
pseudo-employer that was never shared by any other worker) and dyads. The
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average degree in GW is 102 22, which is roughly twice the ratio of edges to
nodes. Finally, the clustering coefficient in GW is 0.71. Figure 3.7 shows a plot of
the cumulative degree distribution along with the best fitting exponential distri-
bution. The exponential fit appears to be good in the lower half of the support,
but the empirical distribution is skewed toward the upper tail.
Curiously, the ratio of edges to vertices and average degree for GW are strik-
ingly similar to those reported in table 3.2 for the network of film actors reported
by Newman (2003). They share very similar ratio of edges to nodes, average
degree, and clustering coefficient. Both networks are formed by projecting a
network linking individuals and their employers onto the set of individuals.
However, a crucial topological difference is that the degree distribution of the
film star network follows a power law distribution. In terms of the processes
generating the network data, the major distribution is that film actors are guar-
anteed to have worked on the same film at the same time, while connection in
the realized mobility network does not imply that two people worked together,
or even that they had the same type of job at the same time; only that they
share a common element in their job histories. As was discussed previously, the
exponential distribution of degree in GW may be interpreted as evidence of sub-
stantial randomness in the connections between workers on the basis of shared
jobs. Conversely, the power law distribution of degree in the film star network
suggests non-random connections between movie stars on the basis or shared
films. This interpretation seems intuitively plausible: famous movie stars will
tend to appear in more films, and to appear in more films with each other, while
more obscure actors are in fewer films, but tend to be in these together.
79
Figure 3.8: Degree distribution of the projection of the realized mobility
network in the PSID sample onto pseudo-employers
The Projection onto M : GM
GM is quite a bit more sparse than GW , most likely because of the restriction
on the number of jobs that any given worker can link together. In GM, 26, 614
edges connect the 5,255 pseudo-employers. Naturally, there is also only one
large component in GM containing 4, 999 of the nodes. The average degree is
9.5, again roughly twice the ratio of edges to nodes. Clustering in GM is 0.57.
Figure 3.8 shows a plot of the degree distribution, along with the best fitting
power law distribution. The power law distribution looks like a reasonable fit
in the middle of the support, but underpredicts in the tails; a fairly standard re-
sult. The only network in the literature I reviewed that had a similar topology is
the network of coauthorship relations between academic physicists (Newman
2003). This similarity is somewhat harder to motivate than the similarities be-
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tweenGW and the film star network, and since I lack information on the shape of
the degree distribution in the physics coauthorship network, it is hard to draw
many implications from the similarity.
The fact that GM follows a power law is quite interesting when contrasted
with the shape of the degree distribution in GW . The connections between pseu-
doemployers based on shared employees has non-random structural features,
while the connections between workers based on shared jobs are essentially ran-
dom. This parallels a finding by Newman et al. (2001) who analyzed the bipar-
tite graph between company directors and the boards on which they serve; the
so-called board-interlock network. That study finds that the degree distribution
in the one-mode projection onto the set of boards shows randomness, but that
the degree distribution in the projection onto the directors is rather non-random.
These results also agree with the analysis in Guillaume and Latapy (2004)
who argue that complex bipartite networks tend to have a power law on one set
of nodes. They also show how the form of the degree distribution will be pre-
served through the projection onto one or the other set of nodes. The realized
mobility network is consistent with a version of their random growth model in
which the number of jobs held by a worker over his life is a Poisson random
variable, but the employers with which these jobs are held are chosen by pref-
erential attachment. These abstract features are consistent with conventional
economic models in which job search behavior of workers is conditionally ran-
dom, but workers are more likely through this random mobility to move into
pseudoemployers that are large. Here, workers are more likely to move into
industries and occupations that have many other employees.
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3.6 Finding Mobility Clusters using Community Detection
Across Workers
The intuition behind using the realized mobility network to think about mar-
ket clusters can be neatly motivated using an example based on labor-market
segmentation. Imagine that the vertex set of the realized mobility network,
V(G)M, is partitoned into two non-intersecting segments, (W1,M1) and (W2,M2).
Think, for instance, of M1 as the set of high-wage employers and M2 as the set of
low-wage employers. We might imagine that there are two sets of workers, W1
and W2, that are stuck working for low-wage employers in the following sense:
worker i has probability pin of getting a job with an employer in his own set
of the partition, and probability pout of connecting to a job in the opposite set.
If this is so, then depending on the level of mobility, there will be more edges
connecting workers to multiple employers in the same segment than there are
edges connecting workers to employers in the opposite segment.
In the extreme case where the probability of transition between the two seg-
ments is zero, the realized mobility network will always have two distinct com-
ponents corresponding to the two segments. If this were the case, then we could
check for the existence of different mobility segments by simply looking for un-
connected components in the graph. Even without turning to the data, the re-
sults from complex network analysis tell us not to expect this method to work.
Complex networks are almost universally characterized by having one large
connected component (Newman 2003). While the realized mobility network is
not a social network in the pure sense, if anything it will have greater connec-
tivity than a standard social network. Indeed, the realized mobility network in
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Unemployment Insurance data from the LEHD analyzed in Abowd et al. (2002)
has one large component that includes most of the nodes in the network. We
therefore know that finding market segments will be more complicated.
When the probability pout > 0, the underlying partition is not revealed by
the component structure of the graph. Instead, we will have a graph in which
there is one large connected component containing nodes from both (W1,M1)
and (W2,M2). However, it should be the case that within each set of the par-
tition, the connections are more dense. The empirical problem, which can be
addressed using tools of complex network analysis, is how to identify the par-
tition by identifying those pockets of relatively higher density. This is known in
the literature on complex networks as a problem of finding community struc-
ture.
Clauset et al. (2004) develops a new method for finding community structure
based on the concept of graph modularity. This is implemented through their
FastCommunity algorithm, which produces results equivalent to those found
using the earlier algorithm, but has linear run times for most graphs, so that
community structure is computable in graphs with millions of vertices.
Modularity is an objective function whose domain is the set of possible par-
titions of W and whose value depends on the structure of GW . To formalize
this a bit, let Π(W) be the set of all partitions of W. So a representative ele-
ment pi = (pi1, ..., piK) ∈ Π(W) is a division of W into K mutually exclusive and
exhaustive subsets. In the current setting, pi is a proposed division of W into
communities. The modularity of GW is meant to measure the extent to which
the proposed division fits the structure of connections in the graph better than
it would fit a graph in which the connections were purely random. If GW were
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connected completely at random with identical probability of connection be-
tween each pair of vertices, then a proposed partition pi will combine densely
connected sets of vertices only by chance.
To define modularity formally, we need some additional terminology.
Let AW be the adjacency matrix of GW . Given v,w ∈ W,.AWvw = 1 if vw is an
edge in GW and is zero otherwise.
Let m be the number of edges in GW
Let δpi : W ×W → {0, 1} be a function such that δpi(v,w) = 1 if there exists pik ∈ pi
such that v ∈ pik and w ∈ pik. are in the same community in C(W) and is zero
otherwise.
Let kv be the degree of node v.
The goal now is to specify a function, Q : Π(W) → R whose value is max-
imized when we have found the community structure with best fit. Whatever
specification we choose for this function will necessarily embed a set of assump-
tions about what defines the community structure of the graph. In a working pa-
per Copic et al. (2009) establish a decision-theoretic foundation for a maximum-
likelihood type of objective function for finding community structure that is
somewhat similar, but not identical, to modularity. Both that function and mod-
ularity suffer from the high dimensionality of the domain space, which is expo-
nential in the number of edges. For this reason, true maximization is generally
impossible and approximation methods are required.
Returning to the definition of modularity, note that given pi, the fraction of
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within-community edges in the graph is
1
2m
∑
v,w∈W
Avwδpi(v,w)
An alternative interpretation of this quantity is as the empirical probability
that a given edge in the graph lies within a community. This is not a good can-
didate as an objective function, because it can be maximized using the trivial
partition pi = W. The idea of modularity is to consider the difference between
this value and the empirical probability of a given edge lying within a commu-
nity when all edges are formed with equal probability.
Taking the degree distribution of the graph as given, and assuming that all
edges occur with equal probability, a basic combinatorial argument establishes
that the probability that a randomly drawn edge does not connect two different
communities is
1
2m
∑
v,w∈W
kvkw
2m
δpi(v,w)
The modularity of GW given pi is defined as
Q(pi) =
1
2m
∑
v,w∈W
(Avw − kvkw2m )δpi(v,w)
The trivial partition, pi = W gives Q(pi) = 0 while positive values for Q in-
dicate the existence of a non-random community structure in the graph. In the
tests reported in Clauset et al. (2004), a maximized value of modularity between
0.3 and 0.7 is indicative of significant community structure.
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Table 3.3: Summary of Job Types in Coworker Segments
Type of Jobs
Seg. 1 Blue Collar Industries; Managers, Foremen, Operators and Truck Drivers
Seg. 2 Health Care and Retail; Nurses, Managers and Clerical Workers
Seg. 3 School Teachers, Teaching Aides and Administrators
Seg. 4 Doctors, Lawyers, Bank Officers, College Professors
Seg. 5 Postal Workers, Firemen
Descriptions of highest frequency industries and occupations in each of the coworker segments.
3.6.1 Segment Structure
Applying the FastCommunity algorithm of Clauset et al. (2004) to the large com-
ponent in GW reveals 21 separate segments at a maximal modularity of 0.48. Of
these segments, the smallest 16 contain only 110 nodes. For the rest of the paper,
I treat these 16 smallest segments as ‘segment 6’.The FastCommunity algorio-
thm appears to break the network up in a non-random manner. That is, the
six segments, which were detected on the basis of mobility patterns alone, have
distinct demographic and economic characteristics as we would expect to find
in different market segments.
I find that these segments have distinct industry and occupation profiles.
Table 3.3 provides the titles of the dominant industries and occupations in each
segmentwhich groups of employers hire more frequently from each segment, or
put another way, the pseudo-employers between which a worker is most likely
to move. The largest two segments split largely along industy lines. Segment
1, containing approximately half of the nodes is concentrated in the blue-collar
industries, while segment 2 is focused in the service sector, especially health
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care. Both of these segments have heavy concentrations of managerial and
non-managerial occupations. This phenomenon repeats in segment 3, which is
concentrated in public education, but which includes teachers, teachers’ aides,
school administrators and principals. Thus, it appears to be the case that mar-
kets are separated by industry, but within industries there is relatively little oc-
cupational segmentation.
Segment 4 is the exception to this rule, and it is an interesting one. It has
no distinct indusrial concentration, but includes several occupations that one
might think of as career occupations, such as doctors, lawyers, bank officials
and college professors. On one hand, this has some intuitive appeal, as we
would expect this group of workers to participate in a different market than the
workers in segment 1-3.
3.6.2 Correlates of Worker Segment
Table 3.4 shows the results from estimating a standard multinomial logit to de-
termine the worker’s segment on the basis of demographic and human capital
characteristics. The model includes controls for age, number of jobs held, and
labor market experience. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the predicted probability
under the model of being in each segment conditional on being a white male
and on levels of education. The correlation of race and gender on segment
choice mostly conform to the underlying industrial and occupational compo-
sition. White males are much more likely to fall in segment 1, while non-white
females are much more likely to fall in segment 2. Given the industrial compo-
sition of these two segments, this is an unsurprising result. Interestingly, race
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Table 3.4: Logit model for Coworker Segment
Seg. 1 Seg. 2 Seg. 3 Seg. 4 Seg. 5 Seg. 6
white 0.13∗ −0.10∗ −0.01 −0.00 −0.03∗ 0.00
(0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
male 0.45∗ −0.28∗ −0.17∗ 0.01 −0.02∗ 0.01∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
High School −0.07∗ −0.00 0.02∗ 0.06∗ −0.00 0.00
(0.020) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.004)
Some College −0.13∗ −0.11 0.03∗ 0.11∗ −0.02∗ −0.01
(0.214) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.005) (0.004)
College −0.24∗ −0.00 0.15∗ 0.12∗ −0.03∗ −0.00
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.004) (0.004)
Postgraduate −0.36∗ −0.02 0.23∗ 0.19∗ −0.03∗ 0.00
(0.019) (0.023) (0.030) (0.035) (0.004) (0.005)
Number of Obs. 7425
Log-likelihood. −8622.9931
Marginal effects from a multinomial logit model predicting worker segment.
The model also controls for age, experience and number of job changes.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗Statistically significant at the 2.5% level.
does not matter for entering segments 3 or 4, and even gender does not strongly
predict membership in segment 4. Being female predicts being in segment 3,
which is concentrated in the public schooling industry.
Increased education is a strong predictor of entering segments 3 and 4, which
is what one would expect given the kinds of jobs workers in those segments
hold. More highly educated workers are far less likely to be in segment 1, the
blue-collar segment. Curiously, education is not a determinant of membership
in segment 2, even though that segment has a concentration of health care pro-
fessionals. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that workers in seg-
ment 2 and 3 are by far the worst paid, at least in terms of the median labor
income.
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Figure 3.9: Predicted probability of appearing in each of the six segments
found by maximizing modularity of the worker projection.
Figure 3.10: Predicted probability of appearing in each of the six segments
found by maximizing modularity of the worker projection.
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3.6.3 Wage Determination By Segment
Interestingly, the segment of the labor market in which the worker participates
does not seem to have a strong influence on wage determination. Table 3.5
shows the results of OLS regressions of the log wage on demographic and hu-
man capital variables, including controls for labor market experience and num-
ber of jobs held. The results are presented for a pooled regression as well as
separately for workers within each segment. Contrary to the radical dual labor
market hypothesis, there are returns to education and age within each segment,
though these returns do differ quantitatively across segment. The influence of
race and gender have the expected sign, except in segment 3 where there is no
return to being white. Segment 2 also has a low, but significant return to being
white. Without a formal model, it is difficult to interpret these patterns, but they
do appear to suggest that at least some aspects of wage determination vary by
segment.
3.7 Finding Mobility Clusters by Maximum Likelihood Parti-
tion of Employers
3.7.1 A Basic Model Of Job Mobility
This is a simple reduced-form model of job-mobility with dual labor markets.
The baseline model assumes that mobility is determined only by the sector in
which the worker is currently employed. In this baseline model, I have not in-
corporated the well-known fact that job mobility varies with age and tenure.
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Table 3.5: Log Earnings Regression on Coworker Segments
Seg.1 Seg.2 Seg.3 Seg.4 Seg.5 Pooled
white 0.211∗ 0.084∗ −0.167∗ 0.171∗ 0.037 0.147∗
(0.0136) (0.0180) (0.0320) (0.0288) (0.0407) (0.0095)
male 0.562∗ 0.539∗ 0.635∗ 0.622∗ 0.781∗ 0.703∗
(0.0132) (0.0186) (0.0354) (0.0262) (0.0421) (0.0084)
number of jobs 0.025 −0.002 0.006 0.006 −0.011 0.013∗
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0078) (0.0015)
age 0.012∗ 0.028∗ 0.027∗ 0.064∗ 0.056∗ 0.103∗
(0.0006) (0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0036)
age2 −0.000∗ −0.000∗ −0.000∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
High School 0.335∗ 0.415∗ 0.505∗ 0.215∗ 0.322∗ 0.362∗
(0.0168) (0.0269) (0.0591) (0.0671) (0.0556) (0.0133)
Some College 0.498∗ 0.640∗ 0.606∗ 0.425∗ 0.533∗ 0.539∗
(0.0181) (0.0282) (0.0596) (0.0672) (0.0621) (0.0140)
College 0.823∗ 1.016∗ 1.181∗ 0.573∗ 0.596∗ 0.816∗
(0.0209) (0.0324) (0.0588) (0.0686) (0.0735) (0.0155)
Postgraduate 1.018∗ 1.134∗ 1.523∗ 0.961∗ 0.390∗ 1.025∗
(0.0261) (0.0356) (0.0589) (0.0684) (0.1117) (0.0169)
Intercept 8.367∗ 8.244∗ 7.724∗ 7.883∗ 7.832∗ 6.528∗
(0.0327) (0.0550) (0.1021) (0.1260) (0.1678) (0.0769)
Number of Obs. 23, 840 12, 704 6, 135 3, 569 2, 079 48, 173
R¯2 0.1889 0.2048 0.2510 0.3044 0.2257 0.2366
Pooled −0.094∗ −0.190∗ −0.534∗ 0.107∗ −0.086
Regression† (0.0354) (0.0359) (0.0369) (0.0379) (0.0402)
Number of Obs. 49, 021
R¯2 0.2409
Description of the effects of segment affiliation on log annual labor market earnings. The Data
are worker-year observations from the PSID sample. The segment affiliation of each worker-
year observation is assigned based on the reported industry-occupation pair. The parenthe-
sized values are standard errors. For purposes of comparison, the final column contains results
from the same model estimated on the pooled sample.
∗ statistically significant in the indicated direction at the 97.5% level of confidence.
† Estimates of the level effect associated with segment affiliation in a pooled regression includ-
ing the same covariates where the effects of those covariates are restricted to be the same across
segments.
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On the one hand, this should not matter too much for the current application,
since ultimately all that matters is the relative number of links within and across
different partitions of the set of employers. On the other hand, if the relation-
ship between tenure and mobility differs across sectors, this model could be
misspecified in a way that affects our inference of the partition structure.
We have data on job histories of the form, D = {(m,w, t)}, where
• m ∈ M is an employer (or pseudo-employer )
• w ∈ W is a worker
• t ∈ T denotes the time of the observation
In general, there is also information on wages, worker characteristics and
employer characteristics. Each of these, especially wages, should be incorpo-
rated into a fully specified mobility model. Again, since the goal here is to iden-
tify segments solely on the basis of mobility patterns, I am ignoring that other
information for the moment.
Jobs
Definition 5 A triple (m,w, t) is an element of the work history of w ∈ W. It says
that w was employed by m at time t. A job is a collection of time-contiguous
work-history elements for worker w with the property that all elements include
the same employer.
A worker, w, will have kw jobs during the sample. The worker’s job history
will look something like this:
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• j(w, 1) = {(m1,w, t1), (m1,w, t1 + 1), ..., (m1,w, t j1)} = (m1, t1, t j1)
• j(w, 2) = {(m2,w, t j1 + 1), ..., (m2,w, t j2)} = (m2, t j1 + 1, t j2)
• ...
• j(w, kw) = {(mkw ,w, t jkw−1 + 1), ..., (mkw ,w, tT )} = (mkw , t jkw + 1, tT )
Let Jw denote the complete job history of w, and let Jw,t be the partial history
of jobs that is completed as of time t.
With the additional restriction that mi , mi+1 for all i. Note that the time
periods do not overlap. This is equivalent to assuming that workers only have
one job at a time, or that only their main jobs are of any consequence. Also,
the time periods for each job are directly adjacent, so there is never an instance
where a worker is not in a job. If we enlarge the concept of a job to include states
of unemployment and transitions out of the sample, then this is not a problem.
Finally, note that the time period at which the first job begins and the last job
ends are censored. For the model I develop here, this does not really matter, but
in general it will.
Job and Employer Types
To introduce the idea of labor market segmentation, we assume that each job
has a latent type, ω j ∈ {0, 1}where ω j = 1 if j is a primary sector job and ω j = 0 if
j is a secondary sector job. In general, a single employer m can offer jobs of both
types, just as a single worker can hold jobs of both types. For the purposes of
this paper, assume that employers only ever offer jobs of one type or the other.
In this case it makes sense to assert that each employer m has a constant type,
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θm ∈ {0, 1} defined just like ω j. This is the latent variable generating variation in
mobility rates. The goal is to estimate this variable.
Job Mobility
Define µ(w, t) = m as the function that maps a worker and time period onto the
worker’s employer during that period. We are interested in the way workers
move between employers. As a very general statement of the problem, we are
interested in the probability that a worker w is employed by employer m con-
ditional on the worker’s entire previous job history as well as the job histories
of all other workers. That is, the probability that w is employed by m at t might
depend on everything that has happened in the labor market up to that point.
pwn,t = Pr(µ(w, t) = n|Jw,t−1, J−w,t−1)
The basic mobility model pursued here is substantially simpler. In particular,
I make the following assumptions:
1. (Markov) pwn,t = Pr(m(w, t) = n|m(w, t − 1) = m). Where you work in the next
period depends only on where you work currently.
2. (Conditional Homogeneity) pwn,t = pw
′
n,t for all w,w′ ∈ W. Job mobility does
not depend on who you are; only where you just worked.
3. (Stationarity) pwn,t = pwn,t′ for all t, t
′ ∈ T .
Therefore, it will make more sense for us to adopt the notation
pmn = Pr(µ(w, t) = n|µ(w, t − 1) = m)
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Labor Market Segmentation
The model of labor market segmentation allows for even more simplification of
the mobility model.
At the beginning of each time period, t, each worker experiences a stochastic
job history event, sw,t ∈ {s1, s2, s3}where
• if s1 occurs, the worker stays with his current employer m
• if s2 occurs, the worker switches to a different primary sector employer
• if s3 occurs, the worker switches to a different secondary sector employer
The hypothesis that there is limited mobility between two segments is for-
malized as follows. Let
qlm = Pr(sw,t = sm|θµ(w,t) = l)
That is, the probability that the worker draws a particular job history event
depends on the state of his current employer. If there are no mobility effects
of labor market segmentation, then we should have ql2 = ql3 for l = 0, 1. The
mobility restrictions in the segmentation model are formalized through the as-
sumptions:
q03 > q02
q12 > q13
These say that a worker is more likely to move to an employer of the same
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type than one of the other type. A weaker assumption is:
q01 + q03 > q02
q11 + q12 > q13
Which says that the probability that you add another unit of tenure within
your sector is greater than the probability of changing sector. The first assump-
tion can be thought of as conditioning on there having been a move. In general,
we expect q01 > q02 + q03 and analogously for the primary sector.
We complete the mobility model under segmentation by assuming that once
we know sw,t, the worker moves to a randomly drawn employer. The probability
of the move is given by ηθm,t where ηθm,t = 0 if θm , θ. (There are two probability
measures over the space of employers; one assigns positive probability only to
workers in the primary segment and the other only to workers in the secondary
segment). So, we finish the mobility model by noting that
pmn =

qθm,1 if m = n
qθm,2
(
η1n,t
1−η1m,t
)
when θn = 1
qθm,3
(
η0n,t
1−η0m,t
)
when θn = 0
Finally, assuming that once a worker moves, the employer is chosen from
the set of all firms of the same type with equal probability, (that is, ηθm,t = ηθm′,t′
for all m,m′, t, t′), we can write this simply as
pmn =

pis,ττ if m = n and θm = τ
pis,ττ′ when m , n and θm = τ and θn = τ′
So, the final model is characterized by six probabilities associated with dif-
ferent kinds of job history events along with the latent variable θ describing
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employer types.
3.7.2 The Structure of Employer-Employer Links Predicted in
the Model
Consider a graph defined from the realized mobility network being projected
onto the set of employers, M. We denote this graph by GM and make the follow-
ing definitions:
• The vertex set of GM, V(GM) = M
• The edge set of GM, E(GM) is derived as follows. (m1,m2) ∈ E(GM) when-
ever there is w ∈ W and t ∈ T such that (m1,w, t) ∈ D and (m2,w, t + 1) ∈ D.
That is, we observe some worker moving from m1 to m2.
Note that GM is a directed graph allowing both multi-edges and self-edges.
It is therefore different from the graph labelled GM in section 3.2. Intuitively,
this graph has an edge for every worker that made a transition between those
two employers. Furthermore, a node has a self-edge for every period and every
worker that stayed with that employer. Therefore, the edges in the network
contain information about mobility between employers, and about tenure with
employers.
Following Copic et al. (2009), let gmn be the number of observed links from m
to n, and let smn be the number of potential links between m and n. Intuitively,
smn should be equal to the sum of number of workers who are ever at smn times
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the number of time periods they are there, since this is the number of chances
for a worker to start at m and move to n.
With this notation in mind, and given the independence assumptions in the
model above, observe that the chance of seeing exactly gmn moves from m to n is
pgmnmn (1 − pmn)smn−gmn
Where pmn is substituted from the job mobility model above.
We can regard GM as having been generated by the job mobility model out-
lined above. In this case, we can write the likelihood function:
Pr(θ, pi|GM) ∝
∏
m,n
pgmnmn (1 − pmn)smn−gmn
=
∏
m,n
[
pi
gmn
s,00(1 − pis,00)smn−gmn
]1(m=n,θm=0) [
pi
gmn
s,11(1 − pis,11)smn−gmn
]1(m=n,θm=1)
[
pi
gmn
m,00(1 − pim,00)smn−gmn
]1(m,n,θm=0) [
pi
gmn
m,00(1 − pim,00)smn−gmn
]1(m,n,θm=1)
[
pi
gmn
m,01(1 − pim,01)smn−gmn
]1(θm=0,θn=1) [
pi
gmn
m,10(1 − pim,10)smn−gmn
]1(θm=1,θn=0)
Taking logs yields
ln Pr(θ, pi|GM) ∝ Ts,00(g)γs,00 + (Ts,00(s) − Ts,00(g))σs,00
+Ts,11(g)γs,11 + (Ts,11(s) − Ts,11(g))(s)σs,11
+Tm,00(g)γm,00 + (Tm,00(s) − Tm,00(g))σm,00
+Tm,11(g)γm,11 + (Tm,11(s) − Tm,11(g))σm,11
+Tm,01(g)γm,01 + (Tm,01(s) − Tm,01(g))σm,01
+Tm,10(g)γm,10 + (Tm,10(s) − Tm,10(g))σm,10
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where Ts,00(g) is the total number of self-links for employers of type 0 in the
graph and Ts,00(s) is the total capacity for such links. Similarly, Tm,01(g) is the total
number of edges in the graph from type 0 nodes to type 1 nodes and Tm,01(s) is
the total capacity of such nodes. γs,00 = ln(pis,00). σs,00 = ln(1 − pis,00). The rest of
the definitions are equivalent. This notation follows Copic et al. (2009).
Determining the segment structure of the labor market is equivalent to
choosing the parameter (θˆ, pˆi) that maximizes the above expression. There are
two complications here: first, we have to deal with the fact that the choice of
the optimal θˆ depends on pˆi and vice-versa. Second, this is a high-dimension
discrete choice problem. We cannot search through the entire space Θ = {0, 1}|M|,
so some approximation method is required.
Having obtained an estimate of θ, the next step is to formally test whether
it is substantially different from either θ = (1, 1, ..., 1) or θ = (0, 0, ..., 0). That
is, I want to formally test whether there are two distinct groups of employers
between which mobility is relatively unlikely. Since this model is nested, it can
be estimated using a likelihood ratio test.
3.7.3 Maximizing the Log-Likelihood
Now using the notation of graph theory becomes useful. Let A be the adjacency
matrix for GM. So Amn = # of links between m and n. Similarly, define S to be
the |M| × |M| matrix whose entries are the capacities of each edge. Recall that θ
is the |M| × 1 vector describing the sectoral affiliation of each employer, m. The
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following relations are instructive:
Ts,00(g) =
∑
m
(1 − θm)Amm
Ts,11(g) =
∑
m
θmAmm
Tm,00(g) =
∑
m,n
(1 − θm)(1 − θn)Amn
Tm,11(g) =
∑
m,n
θmθnAmn
Tm,01(g) =
∑
m,n
(1 − θm)θnAmn
Tm,10(g) =
∑
m,n
θm(1 − θn)Amn
we can rewrite the log-likelihood, ln Pr(θ|GM, pi) =
∑
m

Amm[θm((γs,11 − σs,11) − (γs,00 − σs,00)) + (γs,00 − σs,00)]
+S mm[θm(σs,11 − σs,00) + σs,00]

+
∑
m,n Amn

θmθn

(
γm,11 − σm,11
)
−
(
γm,00 − σm,00
)
−
(
γm,01 − σm,01
)
−
(
γm,10 − σm,10
)

+θm[
(
γm,10 − σm,10
)
−
(
γm,00 − σm,00
)
]
+θn[
(
γm,01 − σm,01
)
−
(
γm,00 − σm,00
)
]
+
[
(γm,00 − σm,00) + (γm,01 − σm,01) + (γm,10 − σm,10)
]

+S mn

θmθn
[
σm,11 − σm,00 − σm,10 − σm,01] + θm [σm,10 − σm,01 − σm,00]
+θn
[
σm,01 − σm,10 − σm,00] + (σm,00 + σm,10 + σm,01)

Evaluating the above expression is straightforward given a proposed parti-
tion, but the search space is both discrete and of large dimension, making this
problem an ideal candidate for simulated annealing.
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Table 3.6: Probability of Transition Between Pseudoemployer Segments
q Estimate Description
q0t 0.2987 Stay in type 0
q00 0.4374 Move from 0 to 0
q01 0.2639 Move from 0 to 1
q1t 0.5734 Stay in type 1
q10 0.1435 Move from 1 to 0
q11 0.2831 Move from 1 to 1
3.7.4 The Likelihood-Maximizing Partition
The best solution, θˆMLE was found by simulated annealing. θˆMLE puts 489 pseu-
doemployers into segment 1 – roughly 10% of the nodes.
The segmentation model implies that the within-segment transitions should
be more likely than between-segment transitions. From θˆMLE, we compute these
probabilities qˆ, which are reported in Table 3.6. As the segmentation model pre-
dicts, the probability of moving to an employer of the same type is higher than
the probability of moving to an employer of the opposite type. Note also that the
probability of staying is nearly twice as high in the small segment, segment 1.
But, conditional on moving, the probability of leaving your segment is roughly
1/3 the probability of staying in it. It seems odd, however, that the probability
of moving from a type 0 to another type 0 job is higher than the probability of
staying in the same job in that segment. This finding could be explained by data
errors. The erroneous coding of industry or occupation will show up in these
data as spurious moves. So, it may be that some of the transitions we observe
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should actually be recoded as accumulation of tenure in the same job. In ei-
ther case, it remains true that leaving the segment is far less likely than staying
within it.
We can use the Likelihood-Ratio test to show that the data reject the null
hypothesis that there is no segmentation in the labor market in favor of the
alternative that there are two segments. The null hypothesis is formalized as
the assumption that θ0 = (0, 0, ..., 0) is the likelihood maximizer. Under the null
hypothesis, the test statistic
LR = −2[log(L(A|θ0, q) − log(L(A|θˆMLE, q)] = 33, 784
is distributed as χ2. The data reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level
of significance.
3.7.5 Characteristics of the Segments
Industrial and Occupational Composition
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the industrial and occupational composition of the
two pseudo-employer segments. These figures give the fraction of pseudo-
employers in each one-digit industry or occupation within each segment. Be-
cause there are only two segments with this method, the separation is more
coarse than in the previous section. Nevertheless, the results are largely consis-
tent. Figure 3.11 gives the industrial composition, and shows that segment 1 is
concentrated in service industries, while segment 0 is concentrated in manufac-
turing. Likewise, figure 3.12 indicates that segment 1 workers are more likely
to be managers and service workers while segment 0 workers are more likely to
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Figure 3.11: Industry Distribution by Segment. Blue is Segment 0, Red is
Segment 1.
Figure 3.12: Occupation Distribution by Segment. Blue is Segment 0, Red
is Segment 1.
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Figure 3.13: Occupation Distribution by Segment within FIRE. Blue is Seg-
ment 0, Red is Segment 1.
have blue-collar jobs.
Figures 3.13 through 3.15 show that there is still segmentation within indus-
tries, indicating that not all of the occupational segmentation detected with this
method is associated with the occupational composition of particular industries.
Within the FIRE industry, figure 3.13 shows that segment 1 jobs are more likely
to be white collar, while segment 0 jobs are blue collar. Within manufactuting,
the evidence is less clear, segment 1 jobs are more likely to be managerial than
segment 0. There is also a division between service and clerical jobs in the Ser-
vice sector. Altogether, these results suggest a division between white and blue
collar jobs.
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Figure 3.14: Occupation Distribution by Segment within Manufacturing.
Blue is Segment 0, Red is Segment 1.
Figure 3.15: Occupation Distribution by Segment within the Service Sec-
tor. Blue is Segment 0, Red is Segment 1.
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Wage Determination
The relationship between labor market segments and wage determination is of
longstanding interest. The dual labor market theory, for instance, predicts that
workers in a ’secondary’ segment will not earn returns to human capital, or at
least not the same returns. Table 3.7 provides a descriptive analysis of the associ-
ation between labor market segments and labor market earnings. Each column
shows the result of a linear regression of the log of labor market earnings on
individual characteristics, job characteristics, and segment affiliation. Model 1
is the baseline model, and does not control for any segment affiliation. The es-
timated coefficients are just as would be predicted in the literature: there are
strong returns to human capital, a concave age-earnings profile, and positive
wage premia associated with being white and male. Model 2 adds an indicator
for segment 1. Recall that segment 1 jobs were more likely to be service jobs, but
also more managerial. Without controlling for industry or occupation, being
assigned a segment 1 job is associated with a -0.114 decrease in annual log earn-
ings. However, we see in column 4 that controlling for the 1-digit industry and
occupation of the job wipes out any significant segment effect while moderately
attenuating the rest of the parameters.
Model 3 allows for arbitrary differences across segments in the coefficients
on individual characteristics. So, if there were differences in returns to human
capital across segments, we would expect to see it here. Model 3 shows that
at least as a descriptive matter, there are differences across the segments. Jobs
in segment 1 are associated with lower correlation between earnings and being
white, and a higher correlation with being male, and having some education
beyond high school. These findings persist when controlling for industry and
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Table 3.7: Pseudoemployer Segment and Labor Market Earnings
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
white 0.144∗ 0.142∗ 0.205∗ 0.075∗ 0.147∗
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0251) (0.0174) (0.0235)
male 0.706∗ 0.693∗ 0.599∗ 0.608∗ 0.548∗
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0243) (0.0192) (0.0247)
age 0.104∗ 0.104∗ 0.102∗ 0.092∗ 0.089∗
(0.0682) (0.0068) (0.0094) (0.0064) (0.0088)
age2 −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
High School 0.374∗ 0.376∗ 0.351∗ 0.262∗ 0.274∗
(0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0346) (0.0252) (0.0334)
Some College 0.559∗ 0.565∗ 0.472∗ 0.354∗ 0.330∗
(0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0386) (0.0282) (0.0378)
College 0.835∗ 0.847∗ 0.768∗ 0.517∗ 0.460∗
(0.0322) (0.00320) (0.0425) (0.0349) (0.0455)
Postgraduate 1.073∗ 1.090∗ 0.923∗ 0.746∗ 0.622∗
(0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0476) (0.0398) (0.0506)
Intercept 6.577∗ 6.641∗ 6.802∗ 7.397∗ 7.488∗
(0.1392) (0.1394) (0.1944) (0.1388) (0.1890)
Segment 1 −0.114∗ −0.383 −0.004 −0.153
(0.0139) (0.2340) (0.0144) (0.2233)
Se
gm
en
t1
white −0.107∗ −0.118∗
(0.0304) (0.0284)
male 0.148∗ 0.098∗
(0.0290) (0.0275)
age 0.005 0.004
(0.0114) (0.0110)
age2 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
High School 0.044 −0.0176
(0.0425) (0.0403)
Some College 0.151∗ 0.041
(0.0458) (0.0434)
College 0.132∗ 0.092
(0.0523) (0.0514)
Postgraduate 0.252∗ 0.180∗
(0.0575) (0.0567)
Ind & Occ. Controls? NO NO NO YES YES
R¯2 0.2392 0.2419 0.2446 0.2443 0.3123
Number of Obs. 45,221 45,221 45,221 45,221 45,221
Parenthesized values are standard errors clustered within individual. The bottom
panel shows models that include an interaction of individual characteristics and the
job being in segment 1.
∗ statistically significant in the indicated direction at the 97.5% level of confidence.
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occupation, as shown in model 5.
Predicting Segment Affiliation
I use a logit model as a convenient method for summarizing the differences in
the types of workers that have jobs in each segment. Using data on each new job,
I estimate the segment of affiliation using individual characteristics. Model 1 in
Table 3.8 shows that workers holding jobs in pseudo-employer segment 1 are
more likely to be female and to be more highly educated that workers holding
jobs in segment 0. These findings are consistent with segment 0 being concen-
trated in blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, while segment 1 jobs are more likely
to be service jobs, and tilted toward white-collar occuapations. A model that
allowed for a larger number of segments might likely detect the cross-cutting
industrial and occupational mobility influences that appear to be at work here.
3.8 Conclusion
I have defined and examined an instance of the realized mobility network in a
sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Analyzing the topol-
ogy of the realized mobility network reveals several features of job mobility that
call for closer study. First, the degree distribution and other static features of the
network topology suggest that there is non-randomness in network formation,
even in the absence of information on individual or pseudo-employer charac-
teristics. These structural features could therefore be informative of otherwise
unobservable characteristics of workers and employers in more conventional
analyses of job matching.
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Table 3.8: Factors Associated with Pseudoemployer Segment Assignment
Model 1 Model 2
white −0.020 −0.019
(0.0265) (0.02817)
male −0.3708∗ −0.3335∗
(0.02389) (0.02701)
age −0.001 −0.000
(0.0013) (0.0014)
number of jobs −0.156∗ −0.150∗
(0.0047) (0.0051)
High School 0.121∗ 0.200∗
(0.0347) (0.0372)
Some College 0.2271∗ 0.3383∗
(0.0369) (0.0399)
College 0.400∗ 0.567∗
(0.0428) (0.0468)
Postgraduate 0.594∗ 0.843
(0.0527) (0.0579)
Log Earnings −0.159∗
(0.0139)
Intercept 1.188 2.524
(0.0676) (0.1355)
Number of Obs. 30,482 27,147
LR 1604.49 1708.71
Pseudo-R2 0.0382 0.0456
Result of logit regression to predict the pseudoemployer
segment of each new worker-pseudoemployer match.
∗ statistically significant in the indicated direction at the
97.5% level of confidence.
Second, using two different methods for partitioning the realized mobility
network, I found significant evidence of clustering among workers and pseudo-
employers on the basis of observed job mobilty. These mobility segments
are distinct in terms of incomes, demographic characteristics, and job types.
Both coworker segments discovered by maximizing modularity(method 1) and
the pseudo-employer segments discovered by maximum likelihood (method 2)
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show segment structure associated with occupational and industrial mobility,
but with complex patterns that may not be revealed in a conventional anal-
ysis of inter-occupational or inter-industry transition rates. For example, the
coworker segments show that workers in manufacturing and service industries
tend to stay within those industries, suggesting that industry may be more in-
fluential than occupation in determining mobility, but the opposite appears to
be the case for workers with substantial occupation-specific skills.
Both methods of segmentation generated non-random splits of the data in
terms of individual characteristics and earnings. They also show that segmenta-
tion has a strong correlation with the estimated correlation between individual
characteristics and earnings, though not in the extreme form predicted by dual
labor market theory. In the coworker segments, there is substantial variation in
the estimated relationship between education, demographic characteristics, and
earnings, as well as in the estimated . The same is true of the raw correlations
associated with the pseudo-employer segments. In the latter case, it is possible
to eliminate most of the variation between segments, but only after controlling
for industry- and occupation- effects as well as unobservable individual hetero-
geneity in earnings. Thus, analysis of the realized mobility network was able to
uncover differences in earnings associated with individual-level unobservables.
All of this supports the claim of the paper that the realized mobility network
contains important and useful information for economic analysis. In this pa-
per, I have gone to one extreme in analyzing the labor market solely in terms
of realized mobility patters. Even at this extreme, I was able to uncover dis-
tinctions in industry- versus occupation specific mobility and earings patterns
associated with unobserved human capital. The next steps in this research pro-
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gram are to develop models of labor market matching as a process of network
evolution that properly conditions on all available data, and to fit these mod-
els using population-level matched employer-employee data. This work will
use data on workers, employers and jobs back into the analysis. Soderberg
(2002) extends the conventional model of random graph formation to condi-
tion connection probabilities on node characteristics. It is possible to extend his
formalism to statistical inference of complex networks with a finite number of
node types. There is also a literature in sociology on longitudinal network anal-
ysis beginning with Holland and Leinhardt (1977) that develops agent-based
models of networks formation in which links are formed on the basis of both
node and edge characteristics, as well as on the basis of networks structure as
a whole. Snijders (2005) and Koskinen and Snijders (2007) develop frequentist
and Bayesian methods for fitting dynamic network models.
If such methods can be developed, there are a range of interesting and impor-
tant questions in labor economics to which they could be applied. For instance,
these methods may be useful in finding methods to correct for endogenous as-
signment of workers to firms when estimating the wage premium associated
with having a particular employer. The same technique could be modified to ad-
dress related questions dealing with the impact of teachers on student achieve-
ment, or the effect or social groups on individual productivity. These methods
may also be useful for finding the boundaries of markets for particular types
of labor, whether those boundaries be related to skill accumulation, or are geo-
graphic. This would help in applications that require detailed understanding of
the extent of a local labor market.
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CHAPTER 4
ENDOGENOUS MOBILITY (WITH JOHN M. ABOWD)
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to explore the consequences for estimates of
worker and firm effects in the decomposition of earnings in longitudinally-
linked employer-employee data when there is endogenous mobility, and to pro-
pose methods of correcting those estimates. Abowd et al. (1999) pioneered the
identification, computation, and inference for the fixed effect estimator of the
decomposition of log earnings into components associated with unobserved
worker and employer heterogeneity. A major factor in the interpretation of
their statisitical model is that it requires the assumption that the assignment
of workers to firms is random conditional on all observable characteristics and
the design of the stationary unobservables. This assumption is at odds with
many models of job assignment, in particular, those in which workers sort into
jobs according to their comparative advantage. Since structural interpretations
of the measured heterogeneity have major consequences for our understanding
of the labor market, it is important to weaken the assumption that job mobility
and assignments are exogenous to earnings.
The central problem of this paper is one manifestation of a fundamental
challenge of empirical social science: separating the influence of correlated un-
observables and sorting from the direct effect of group membership. Our ap-
proach is analogous to estimating treatment effects in the presence of selection
on unobservables. It is just that here the number of possible treatments, that
is employers, numbers in the millions. We construct an instrument for the ac-
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tual assignment of workers to firms that exploits the relational structure of our
data. The key insight is that the work histories of one’s coworkers and previous
employers are informative of one’s own employment history, while being plau-
sibly unrelated to to whatever idiosyncratic wage innovations drive assignment
at the margin.
Correcting estimates firm effects on wages for endogeneity bias is useful in
a number of applications. First, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate as
to whether estimates of employer-specific wage premia constitute evidence in
contradiction of the law of one wage. If the bias correction does not affect the
significance of firm effects, it suggests that firms really do play an important
direct role in wage determination, consistent with sociological evidence, but
contrary to the neoclassical model of a competitive labor market. Furthermore,
it helps to resolve some of the debates spawned by the early empirical results
based on the assumption of exogenous mobility. These early results show lit-
tle correlation between estimated employer wage premia and worker-specific
earnings. In other words, high wage workers do not systematically appear in
high-wage firms. This has often been cited as evidence against theories of assor-
tative matching, and in favor of models of frictional search, which predict this
lack of assortativity. The empirical results have spawned a theoretical literature
attempting to construct frictional search models with assortative matching, in
which estimated firm- and worker- wage components would misrepresent the
true assignment structure in the economy (Abowd et al. 2009; Lentz Forthcom-
ing).
Estimates of person- and firm-effects are also being increasingly used in
downstream applications. Iranzo et al. (2008) and Abowd et al. (2003) use esti-
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mates of person effects to measure the human capital distribution within firms.
Combes et al. (2008) use a similar decomposition to estimate the contribution of
neighborhoods to spatial earnings dispersion. Schmutte (2010) relies on consis-
tent estimates of firm effects to infer the role of local job referral networks on
earnings outcomes. Our estimates should be of interest in all such applications,
as the specter of endogenous mobility clouds the interpretation of empirical re-
sults that rely on consistency of estimated person- or firm-effects.
There is also a parallel literature in the economics of education that uses
value-added models to estimate the contributions of teachers and classrooms
to student achievement. Endogenous assignment is just as much a problem
there as it is here. Indeed, several recent studies have shown that the assump-
tion of exogenous assignment in value-added models is rejected by the data
(Rothstein 2010; Koedel and Betts 2010). Nevertheless, validation studies have
shown that estimates from the value-added models are significantly correlated
with independent assessments of teacher productivity. Our method would pro-
vide a direct method of assessing whether correcting the endogeneity bias in
value-added models would substantially change their results. Our method can
be implemented as long as one has a data set in which the realized network of
connections between individuals and groups is sufficiently detailed to provide
identifying variation.
We proceed by setting up the log earnings decomposition proposed by
Abowd et al. (1999) so that we can clearly articulate the nature of the endoge-
nous mobility problem. Then we report the results of two tests of the exogenous
mobility assumption conducted by Abowd et al. (2010). As we will see, the null
of exogenous mobility is rejected, but the associated analysis of mobility pat-
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terns provides interesting information about the nature of the true model. Next,
we present an illustrative theoretical model with endogenous job mobility and
suggest an IV estimator based on the use of relational information. Turning to
implementation, we set up a formal statistical model with endogenous mobil-
ity, in which earnings and job mobility are determined by latent classifications
of workers, firms, and matches. This is a mixture model in which the proba-
bility of forming a link between a given worker and firm depends on a latent
classification. We show that the model is identified and show how to estimate it
using the Gibbs sampler.
4.2 What is Endogenous Mobility and Does it Matter?
Abowd et al. (1999) originally proposed the linear decomposition of log wage
rates as the least squares fit of the equation
w = Xβ + Dθ + Fψ + ε (4.1)
where w is the [N × 1] stacked vector of log wage outcomes wit, X is the [N × k]
design matrix of observable individual and employer time-varying characteris-
tics (the intercept is normally suppressed, with y and X measured as deviations
from overall means); D is the [N × I] design matrix for the individual effects;F is
the [w × J − 1] design matrix for the employer effects (non-employment is sup-
pressed here). ε is the [N × 1] vector of statistical errors whose properties will
be elaborated below;
[
βT θT ψT
]T
are the unknown effects with dimension
[k × 1] , [I × 1] , and [J − 1 × 1] associated with each of the design matrices.
The assumption of exogenous mobility appears in the restriction that
E(ε|X,D, F) = 0. As long as the matrix of data moments has full rank – a non-
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trivial assumption – this conditional moment restriction yields a consistent es-
timator for the parameter vector. But this imposes that a workers employment
history is completely independent of the idiosyncratic part of earnings captured
in ε. Intuitively, this model is equivalent to assuming that all assignments are
pre-determined at birth given full knowledge of X,D, F and
[
βT θT ψT
]T
.
Hence, there is no room for features included in most reasonable models of job
mobility and assignment to affect either the duration of matches or the assign-
ment of workers to particular employers.
Identification in the statistical model of
[
βT θT ψT
]
also requires that
[X DF]T [X DF] be of full rank. Abowd et al. (2002) showed that this condition
is equivalent to connectedness of the realized mobility network constructed by
connecting all workers to every employer they are observed to match with dur-
ing the sample. This network is a static bipartite graph on worker and employer
nodes. As we will see, our identification strategy also has an interpretation in
terms of the realized mobility network. We use information in the realized mo-
bility network that predicts employer assignments but that we assume is condi-
tionally independent of earnings residuals achieve identification.
The least squares solution for the parameters in equation are orthogonality
of each design matrix with respect to the estimated residual implying that the
estimated effects are also orthogonal to the estimated residual.
βˆ
′
X′εˆ = 0, θˆ
′
D′εˆ = 0 and ψˆ′F′εˆ = 0 (4.2)
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4.2.1 Tests of Endogenous Mobility
Abowd et al. (2010) develop two formal tests for endogenous job mobility and
apply them using employer-employee matched data from the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program of the U.S. Census Bureau.
Here we survey the basic nature of the tests and their results. Their tests exploit
the implicit restriction that future assignments of workers to firms are uninfor-
mative about current earnings residuals. Under the null hypothesis of endoge-
nous mobility, these future assignments have no predictive power with respect
to the residual. The first test, ”Test 1”, checks whether a worker’s future em-
ployers are independent of the current period residual. The second test, ”Test
2”, checks whether the future employees of a particular employer are predic-
tive of the residuals on their current period wage payments. For a thorough
description of the test statistics, see Appendix B.3
Both tests reject the null of endogenous mobility. The test statistic for Test
1 is X28,991 = 7, 438, 692 with Pr{X2ν2} < 0.001. The test statistic for Test 2 is
X2900 = 172, 295 with Pr{X2ν2} < 0.001. These are consistent with the related tests
in Rothstein (2010) that falsify the endogenous mobility assumption in value-
added models for longitudinally linked education data.
Some figures associated with the tests show an interesting relationship be-
tween estimates firm effects and residuals. Figure 4.1 shows the probability of
coming from a job in each decile of the firm-effect (ψ distribution conditional on
the decile of the current period residual. These plots show that workers who
earn very high or very low residuals on their next job are more likely to have
come from low wage employers that workers who exit to jobs that pay an aver-
age residual. Workers who are in average residual jobs are more likely to have
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Figure 4.1: Test 1 of the exogenous mobility assumption: relationship be-
tween current period residual and past employer for workers
who separate.
come from high wage jobs. Also, turning to figures 4.2-4.4 show frequencies of
transition to employers in different deciles of the firm-effect distribution condi-
tional on the current residual and ψ-decile. We see that the transition probabili-
ties for workers with the lowest and highest residuals are far flatter that workers
at the middle of the residual distribution.
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Figure 4.2: Test 1 of the exogenous mobility assumption: transition rates
for workers with low earnings residuals
4.3 A Motivating Example of Endogenous Mobility with Com-
parative Advantage and Learning
To fix ideas regarding the endogeneity of job mobility and motivate our general
estimation strategy, consider a labor market model with comparative advantage
across firms and learning. The model is a variant of that proposed by Gibbons
et al. (2005). The output of worker i working for employer j at time t is given by
yit = exp(Xitβ + ϕi jt) (4.3)
with ϕi jt = Zi + b j(ηi + εi jt) + c j
The components of the error term ϕi jt have familiar interpretations. The ef-
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Figure 4.3: Test 1 of the exogenous mobility assumption: transition rates
for workers with earnings residuals in the fifth decile
fect Zi is the component of worker ability equally valued by all employers. ηi is
an ability component that is differentially valued and assumed to be unknown
to market participants. c j is the true employer effect on productivity (and hence
earnings) while b j is an employer-specific valuation of ηi.
Assume that competition among employers is severe enough that workers
receive a wage equal to their expected output. Under standard learning results,
if output is commonly observed, then all market participants can update their
beliefs about ηi from output realizations. Under mild restrictions on the rela-
tionship between b j and c j, workers will move from one employer to the next
as beliefs about their ability evolve. In this setting, assignment to an employer
with a particular realization of (c j, b j) is endogenous to the wage. In particu-
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Figure 4.4: Test 1 of the exogenous mobility assumption: transition rates
for workers with earnings residuals in the tenth decile
lar, positive output and wage shocks associated with employer learning will be
correlated with mobility to employers with higher realization of b j.
To pin things down a little more, note that when εi jt is log normal, we have:
lnwit = Xitβ + Zi + b jmi,t−1 + c j +
1
2
b2jσ
2
t + µit (4.4)
where mi,t−1 is the expectation after t−1 output realizations of the unobserved
component of worker ability. σ2t is the posterior variance of unobserved ability
after t − 1 realizations. Finally, µit is measurement error, which we assume to be
orthogonal to sector affiliation along with everything else in the model. Details
of the model may be found in Gibbons et al. (2005).
This provides a compelling case for why the Abowd et al. (1999) (hereafter
121
AKM) decomposition of log earnings into components associated with person
and firm specific heterogeneity might be problematic in the presence of endoge-
nous mobility. AKM estimate
lnwit = Xitβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + νit (4.5)
In this model, the error term embeds all of the latent heterogeneity associated
with the learning process and its attenuation by employer-specific valuation of
unknown ability components.
νit = b jmi,t−1 +
1
2
b2jσ
2
t + µit (4.6)
Under the Bayesian learning model, beliefs evolve as a Martingale so that
we can express beliefs about worker i’s ability after t − 1 periods, mi,t−1, as the
sum of initial beliefs and the sum of independent innovations:
mi,t−1 = mi,0 +
t−1∑
τ=1
ξi,τ (4.7)
So we have
νit = b jmi,0 + b j
t−1∑
τ=1
ξi,τ +
1
2
b2jσ
2
t + µit (4.8)
For the estimates of θ and ψ from the AKM decomposition to be consistent
for fixed ability, Zi, and the employer specific productivity effect c j, would re-
quire that employer assignment be orthogonal to vit. Clearly, this is violated,
since higher realizations of ξiτ will be associated with assignment to employers
with higher realizations of b j. To the extent that c j is negatively correlated with
b j, this will probably induce an attenuating bias on the true employer effect. In
an extreme case, one could even imagine that this would invert the ordinality
of the estimated employer effects ψ from the true ordering by values of c j.
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We can obtain consistent estimates provided an instrument is available for
the endogenous assignments of workers to firms that is orthogonal to vit (we also
need a proxy for 12b
2
jσ
2
t , but assume following Gibbons, et al. (2005) that this is
wiped out by the inclusion of tenure and experience in Xit). We can assume that
initial beliefs mi,0 have mean zero conditional on observables since anything else
can be absorbed into Zi. The major problem is to find an instrument orthogonal
to
∑t−1
τ=1 ξi,τ. Gibbons, et al. use lagged assignments and their interaction with ob-
servable characteristics as an instrument for endogenous sectoral assignments
in a quasi-differenced version of the wage equation. Their procedure works be-
cause their method of quasi-differencing removes all of the lagged innovations
ξiτ except for one so that assignments two periods back are plausibly exogenous
with respect to recent innovations. To maintain the AKM decomposition, we
need an instrument that is orthogonal to the full history of innovations for each
worker.
A natural candidate for such an instrument under the model is the set of as-
signments of your past coworkers, particularly those with similar observable
characteristics. The model predicts that the market will hold similar beliefs
about their unobserved productivities to your own, so in expectation, their fu-
ture assignments should be good predictors of your own assignment, at least in
terms of predicting the value of (b j,c). At the same time, the model assumes that
output realizations are independent across workers, so your innovations have
nothing to do with your former coworkers’ current employer assignments.
Intuitively this instrument will work because the innovations driving assign-
ment will load error correlated with ηi onto the employers of your coworkers.
Since their assignments are orthogonal to the innovations, they will infuse vari-
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ance but not bias onto their ψ estimates. On average, most of these employers
will be of a similar type to your own, so the employer-specific wage compo-
nents, c j will tend to get assigned to the ’right’ types of employers.
Let F˜it be the instrument vector with dimension identical to Fit which is
the it’th row of the design matrix of employer effects in AKM. The entries in
F˜ are the empirical probabilities of being employed by employer j in period t
formed as the fraction of former coworkers with similar observable character-
istics working in each of those firms. By construction, F˜ orthogonal to νit and
correlated with F. The IV estimator solves
X′X X′D X′F
D′X D′D D′F
F˜′X F˜′D F˜′F


β
θ
ψ
 =

X′
D′
F˜
 y (4.9)
Where for the moment we ignore the potential endogeneity of participation
and experience manifested in the design matrix of person effects, D. Implemen-
tation of the IV estimator turns on whether solving this system is computation-
ally feasible.
4.4 A General Model with Endogenous Mobility
In appendix B.2, we sketch the construction of an instrumental variables esti-
mator based on the intuition derived in the preiovus section. That estimator
takes advantage of the full structure of the realized mobility network. The real-
ized mobility network has node sets representing firms and workers, with edge
formation determined by a mobility process that depends on edge characteris-
tics, including match quality, and node characteristics, including latent ability
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of workers and latent productivity of employers.
Here, we set up a somewhat simplified version of that strategy. We assume
workers, firms and matches have latent classifications that we cannot observe,
but that determine earnings and mobility. The statistical model is very gen-
eral and is compatible with many differnt structural models. Formally, we use
the latent class model to identify workers and firms with similar mobility and
earnings patterns and then to estimate the effect on earnings related to member-
ship in these classes. We conduct Bayesian inference using an adaptation of the
Gibbs sampler algorithm for finite mixture models (Tanner 1996; Diebolt and
Robert 1994) to our case with multiple overlapping levels of correlation across
observations. Our application and proposed procedure are related to stochas-
tic blockmodels and other methods for the detection of ’communities’ of nodes
in social networks, the main innovation being our abiilty to use both node and
edge characteristics in predicting the matches (Hoff et al. 2002; Newman and
Leicht 2007; Neville and Jensen 2005).
4.4.1 Model Setup
Agents of the model are workers, indexed i ∈ {1 . . . I} ≡ I and firms, indexed
j ∈ {0 . . . J} ≡ J, where j = 0 is “not employed.” Each worker has a latent abil-
ity class, denoted ai ∈ A, and each firm, except j = 0, has a latent productivity
class denoted b j ∈ B. In addition, each worker-firm match has an associated
heterogeneity component that affects both wages and mobility: ki j ∈ K. A, B and
K are discrete with cardinality L,M + 1 and Q. The “not employed firm” is a
single entity in its heterogeneity class, so the class b0 has no employer hetero-
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geneity. To make the subsequent formulas easier to interpret, assume that the
elements of A, B and K are rows from the identity matrices IL, IM and IQ, rep-
sectively. For instance, if L = 2, we have A = {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. The assignments of
workers and firms to ability and productivity classes are independent multino-
mial random variables with parameters pia, pib. We allow for endogeneity in the
match quality by letting the probability of k depend on ability and productivity.
So Pr
(
ki j = k|ai = a, b j = b
)
= pik|ab.
The log of earnings, when actually employed in any match, is given by
wi jt = α + aiθ + b jψ + ki jµ + εit (4.10)
where θ, ψ, µ are vectors of parameters describing the effect on the level of log
earnings associated with membership in the various heterogeneity classes. We
take ε to be normal with mean 0 and variance σ2, independent and identically
distributed across individuals and over time. When not employed, the individ-
ual earns a reservation log wage of
wi0t = α + aiθ + ψ0 + ki0µ + εit (4.11)
where ψ0 is just the appropriate element of ψ and ki0µ allows for heterogeneity
in home production with the same effects as in the market sector.
We formalize endogenous mobility by allowing those matches and employ-
ment durations that are observed to depend on ability, productivity and match
quality. Let J (i, t) be the index function that returns the identifier of the firm in
which i is employed in period t. Define the variable sit = 1 if i separates from his
current job at the end of period t and sit = 0 otherwise. We let the probability of
separation depend on the match quality by specifying
Pr
(
sit = 1|ki J(i,t)) = fse (ai, bJ(i,t), ki J(i,t); γ) ≡ γabk (4.12)
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where 0 ≤ γabk ≤ 1. Conditional on separation, the productivity class of the next
employer depends on the productivity of the current employer, the ability of the
worker, and the quality of the current match
Pr
(
bJ(i,t+1)|ai, bJ(i,t), ki J(i,t)) = ftr (ai, bJ(i,t), ki J(i,t); δ) ≡ δabk ∈ ∆M+1 (4.13)
where δabk ≡ [δ0|abk, ..., δM|abk] is a 1 × (M + 1) vector of transition probabilites,
∆M+1 is the unit simplex, and J (i, 0) = 0 for all i. The transition probabilities are
indexed by all of the latent heterogeneity in the model. Within a heterogeneity
class, the identity of the precise employer selected is completely random, as is
the identity of an individual within an ability class.
4.5 Likelihood, Prior and Posterior Distributions
4.5.1 Likelihood functions
We begin by developing the likelihood function for the observed and latent data.
The observed data, yit, consist of wage rates, separations, accessions, and iden-
tifier information:
yit =
[
wi J(i,t)t, sit, i, J (i, t)
]
for i = 1, ..., I and t = 1, ...T. (4.14)
The latent data vector, Z, consists of the heterogeneity classifications.
Z = [a1, . . . , aI , b1, . . . , bJ, k11, k12, . . . , k1J, k21, . . . , kIJ] (4.15)
In practice, we only ever use or update the heterogeneity classifications for the
matches that are actually observed, the number of which is bounded above by
T × I. That is, we only care about ki j where i j is such that j = J(i, t) for some t.
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Finally, the complete parameter vector is
ρT =
[
α, θT , ψT , µT , σ, γ, δ, pia, pib, pik|ab
]
, ρ ∈ Θ (4.16)
We assume that workers and firms are infinitely-lived. The complete process
starts at t = 1, with continuous sampling continuing to date T. We model inital
conditions by assuming that everyone enters the labor force at t = 1 and are
assigned an employer completely at random. In other words, we assume that
the matches initially observed are exogenous. The observed data matrix for this
time interval is denoted Y . The likelihood function for the joint distribution
(Y,Z) is given by
£ (ρ|Y,Z) ∝
I∏
i=1

T∏
t=1
1√
2piσ2
exp
[
− (wi J(i,t)t−α−aiθ−bJ(i,t)ψ−ki J(i,t)µ)
2
2σ2
]
× T−1∏
t=1
[
1 − γ〈ai〉〈bJ(i,t)〉〈ki J(i,t)〉
]1−sit [
γ〈ai〉〈bJ(i,t)〉〈ki J(i,t)〉
]sit
× T−1∏
t=1
[
δ〈bJ(i,t+1)〉|〈ai〉〈bJ(i,t)〉〈ki J(i,t)〉
]sit

(4.17)
×
I∏
i=1
J∏
j=1

 L∏
`=1
(pia`)ai`
  M∏
m=1
(pibm)b jm

 Q∏
q=1
(
piq|`m
)ki jq
 (4.18)
where the notation pia` denotes the `th element of pia (similarly for pibm, b jm, etc.)
and 〈x〉means the index of the non-zero element of the vector x.
The likelihood factors into a part due to the observed data conditioned on
the latent, and the latent conditioned on the parameters.
The observed data likelihood conditional on the latent data factors further
into separate contribution from earnings and the mobility process. The mobility
process is Markov, and conditionally independent of the earnings realizations
once we know the latent classifications of the workers firms and matches.
The power of the model comes from the predictive equation for Z given the
observed data and the parameters, which we can compute as the complete data
128
likelihood divided by the observed data likelihood. The observed data likeli-
hood is calculated by margining out the latent data.
4.5.2 Prior distributions
The parameter vector ρ has a prior distribution that is composed of the product
of priors on each of the main components of the parameter space. Conditional
on the heterogeneity probabilities, the coefficients in the log wage equation have
prior distributions proportional to a constant (each one uniform on a wide, but
finite, interval of R) and subject to the constraint that the probability-weighted
average effects are all zero. That is,
piTa θ = pi
T
bψ = pi
T
k|ab(`m)µ = 0 (4.19)
for all `,m where pik|ab(`m) ≡ Pr
(
ki j = k|ai = `, b j = m
)
. The variance parameter, σ,
has the inverted gamma prior IG (ν0, s0) with prior degrees of freedom small
and prior s20 large. Each vector of probabilities has a Dirichlet prior with each
element of the parameter vector given by the inverse of the dimension of the
probability vector.
4.5.3 Posterior distributions
The posterior distribution of ρ given (Y,Z) is given by
p (ρ|Y,Z) ∝ £ (ρ|Y,Z) 1
σν0+1
exp
(
− s
2
0
σ2
) L∏
`=1
pi
1
L−1
a`
M∏
m=1
pi
1
M−1
bm (4.20)
×
L∏
`=1
M∏
m=0
Q∏
q=1
pi 1Q−1q|`mγ 12−1`mq (1 − γ`mq) 12−1 M∏
m′=0
δ
1
M+1−1
m′ |`mq
 .
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Which factors into independent posterior distributions as follows:
α
θ
ψ
µ

|σ ∼ N

ˆ
α
θ
ψ
µ

, σ2
(
GTG
)−1

(4.21)
where
ˆ
α
θ
ψ
µ

=
(
GTG
)−1
GTw
σ2 ∼ IG
(
ν
2
,
2
νs2
)
(4.22)
pia ∼ D
(
na1 +
(
1
L
− 1
)
, . . . , naL +
(
1
L
− 1
))
(4.23)
pib ∼ D
(
nb1 +
(
1
M
− 1
)
, . . . , nbM +
(
1
M
− 1
))
(4.24)
pik|ab ∼ D
(
nk|ab1 +
(
1
Q
− 1
)
, . . . , nk|abQ +
(
1
Q
− 1
))
(4.25)
γlmq ∼ D
(
nsep`mq +
(
1
2
− 1
)
, nstay`mq +
(
1
2
− 1
))
(4.26)
δb|lmq ∼ D
(
ntrans0|`mq +
(
1
M + 1
− 1
)
, . . . , ntransM|`mq +
(
1
M + 1
− 1
))
(4.27)
The above factorizations contain some new notation. G = [A BK] is the full
design matrix of ability, productivity, and match types in the complete data,
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and w is the vector of observed earnings. The term ν in the posterior of σis
ν = N + ν0 − (L + M + Q) and
s2 =

w −G
ˆ
α
θ
ψ
µ


T 
w −G
ˆ
α
θ
ψ
µ


ν
(4.28)
the rest of the parameters are sampled from Dirichlet posteriors, denoted by
D. Finally, we have various counts from the completed data. na` is the count of
workers with ability class `. nbm is the number of employers in productivity class
m. nk|abq is the number of matches observed in quality class q. n
sep
lmq is the number
of observations in which a worker in ability class ` separates from an employer
in productivity class m when match quality was q. Finally, ntransm′ |`mqis the number
of transitions by workers in ability class `from a match with an employer in
productivity class m and match quality class q to an employer in productivity
class m′.
4.6 Estimation Procedure
We start with initial values for the parameter vector and latent data, ρ(0),Z(0). We
have already defined the distributions of the parameters given the observed and
latent data above. To complete the specification, we define the distributions for
the latent variables conditional on the observed data and the parameters. For
instance, to update the ability classifications for the workers, we need to sample
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from a multinomial with probability of the `th class equal to
p (ai = `|a−i, b, k,Y, ρ) = p (a−i, b, k,Y |ρ, ai = `) p(ai = `)p (a−i, b, k,Y |ρ)
=
pia`p (a−i, b, k,Y |ρ, ai = `) p(ai = `)∑L
`
′
=1
[
pia`′ p (a−i, b, k,Y |ρ, ai = `′) p(ai = `′)
] . (4.29)
This requires computing the likelihood function under each assignment of i to
an ability classification. The update formulas for b j and ki j are exactly analo-
gous. This is a high dimension procedure, requiring roughly L evaluations of
the likelihood per individual, M per firm, and Q per match, for each iteration.
However, given the simple form of the likelihood, these computations should
not be excessively burdensome. Furthermore, much of this work can be paral-
lelized if necessary. The updating for each ai is an independent task. Further-
more, most of the structure of the likelihood function remains the same as we
tweak individual assignments, which we exploit to obtain further simplifica-
tion.
With the posterior distributions as defined in the previous section, the Gibbs
sampler can be implemented as follows:
σ(1) ∼ p
(
σ|α(0), θ(0)T , ψ(0)T , µ(0)T , γ(0), δ(0), pi(0)a , pi(0)b , pi(0)k|ab, a(0)1 , . . . , . . . , k(0)IJ ,Y
)

α
θ
ψ
µ

(1)
∼ p


α
θ
ψ
µ

|γ(0), δ(0), pi(0)a , pi(0)b , pi(0)k|ab, a(0)1 , . . . , k(0)IJ , σ(1),Y

γ(1) ∼ p
(
γ|δ(0), pi(0)a , pi(0)b , pi(0)k|ab, a(0)1 , . . . , k(0)IJ , α(1), θ(1)T , ψ(1)T , µ(1)T ,Y
)
...
a(1)I ∼ p
(
aI |δ(1), pi(1)a , pi(1)b , pi(1)k|ab, a(1)1 , . . . , a(1)I−1, b(1)1 , . . . , k(1)IJ , α(1), θ(1)T , ψ(1)T , µ(1)T ,Y
)
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4.7 Monte Carlo Estimates
We demonstrate the validity of our estimation procedure with a Monte Carlo
study. Our model is an extension of standard data augmentation (Tanner 1996).
As such, theoretical results on the convergence of the data augmentation algo-
rithm and Gibbs sampler should obtain here. The main novelty in our approach
is the presence of multiple levels of latent variables. Each observation belongs to
three separate latent classes: a worker-specific ability class, an employer-specific
productivity class, and a match-specific quality class. The model thus poses
problems of both identification and of convergence. As we show, our Gibbs
sampler performs well for inference regarding the parameters associated with
earnings effects of the latent classifications. Specifically, our model detects en-
dogenous mobility bias that is the object of primary interest in this study.
To demonstrate our estimation procedure, we simulate data under a model
with L = M = Q = 2 heterogeneity classes. In our model economy, there are
I = 100 workers and J = 20 employers. We observe workers in each of T = 50
time periods. The simulated data allow for both the separation decision and
the job allocation at transition to depend on match quality. Furthermore, match
quality is correlated with latent worker ability and latent employer productivity,
so there is a rich structure of endogenous mobility in the model. We simulate
the model under the parameterization described in section B.1.1.
Section B.1.2 shows summary statistics for the data simulated under the
model. The data contain 373 distinct employer-employee matches, not includ-
ing spells of unemployment. The simulated job mobility and earnings histories
reflect the model parameterization. As expected given the model, the average
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of log earnings per period, calculated across periods of employment, is indistin-
guishable from zero.
Of primary interest for our purpose are estimates of the Abowd et al. (1999)
decomposition in these data. We use the preconditioned conjugate gradient
algorithm to solve the fixed effect moment equations with person- and firm-
effects, as in Abowd et al. (2002). The correlation between estimated person- and
firm-effects on realized matches in these estimates is 0.12. The true correlation
based on the actual values of θ and ψ used to generate the data is 0.10.
We implement the Gibbs sampler to estimate this model. To implement the
sampler, we need to choose starting points for the latent heterogeneity classes
as well as for the model parameters. Furthermore, we need to chose a burn-in
period to allow the sampler to converge to the posterior. In this Monte Carlo ex-
ercise, the sampler converges within 100 iterations to point mass on the true la-
tent classifications. Thereafter, the sampler converges immediately to sampling
from the posterior distribution for the parameters. This is because the posterior
for the parameters given the latent data factors into the product of Dirichlet and
Normal-Gamma posteriors. The results presented here use randomly chosen
starting values for the latent heterogeneity classs. We initialize all parameters in
the wage equation to zero, and start the categorical variables at uniform distri-
butions. The sampler iterates between sampling from the posterior distribution
for the model parameters conditional on the observed and latent data, and sam-
pling from the predictive distribution for the latent classes given the observed
data and parameters. The choice of starting point does not matter: up to a rela-
beling of the heterogeneity classes, the sampler quickly converges to the same
solution.
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Figure 4.5: Posterior distribution of parameters from the earnings equa-
tion based on draws from the Gibbs sampler.
To sample from the posterior for α, θ, ψ, µ, σ requires an identifying assump-
tion. Here, unlike Abowd et al. (2002), we set one effect equal to zero. Since
we only have two classes for each type of heterogeneity, this means we estimate
four parameters for the earnings equation along with the standard deviation of
the structural error. In addition, we have to specify prior parameters for the
Normal-Gamma distribution. We assume prior degrees of freedom equal to
one, and also set the prior standard error equal to one. The prior for (α, θ, ψ, µ)
is normal with mean zero and prior covariance matrix is the identity matrix.
Figure 4.5 contains histogram plots of the posterior of the parameters from
the wage equation. By comparing these values with the truth presented in sec-
tion B.1.2, we see that up to reidentification, the model converges to the truth.
135
As a result, our procedure is able to detect the small endogeneity bias in the esti-
mated correlation between worker and employer heterogeneity classes. Finally,
section B.1.3 presents the posterior mode for the cateogorical variables in the
model. A comparison with the model parameters and the simulated separation,
transition, and match rates show that the model is very accurately capturing the
evidence from the data. Again, this is unsurprising since the simulator quickly
finds the true latent ability, productivity, and match classifications for the data.
4.8 Conclusion
Could we randomly assign workers to jobs without changing the manner in
which their wages were determined? Either their employers know of the ran-
dom assignment, and would, presumably, compensate them differently than
workers they hired, or they would not, in which case those workers would be
non-randomly selected from the pool of potential applicants. It is easy to imag-
ine randomizing applications but not realized assignments. We do not have an
ideal experiment that identifies the effect of assignments of workers to firms. It
is difficult to think of what an ideal experiment would be.
The central problem of this paper is one manifestation of a fundamental chal-
lenge of empirical social science: separating the influence of correlated unob-
servables and sorting from the direct effect of group membership. Exploiting
the wealth of information about labor market behavior locked in the relational
structure of matched data holds great potential to adderss these problems. We
use matched data to construct an instrument for the actual assignment of work-
ers to firms that exploits the relational structure of our data. The key insight
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is that the work histories of one’s coworkers and previous employers are infor-
mative of one’s own employment history, while being plausibly unrelated to to
whatever idiosyncratic wage innovations drive assignment at the margin.
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APPENDIX A
JOB REFERRAL NETWORKS AND THE DETERMINATION OF
EARNINGS IN LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. These results are standard in the job search literature. See Rogerson,
Shimer and Wright (2005). Since workers are wealth maximizers, and the evo-
lution of portable skills eit is unrelated to pJ(i,t), we can model search over wage
premia, p, and ignore determination of e. Since workers are myopic about the
evolution of the referral network, the decision environment is stationary so the
value of holding a job with wage premium p is given by the Bellman equation
rV(p) = p + λ1
∫ ∞
0
[
max{V(p′),V(p)} − V(p)] dF˜(p′) + δ [U − V(p)] (A.1)
where r is the discount rate, U is the value of becoming unemployed, and F˜(p)
is the cumulative distribution of offers, p, appropriately transformed from F(ψ)
given above. The key behavioral assumption is that workers act as if the offer
distribution F˜ is fixed. The corresponding Bellman equation for the value of
becoming unemployed is
rU = pb + λ0
∫ ∞
0
[
max {V(p′) − U}] dF˜(p′) (A.2)
It is clear that V(p) is increasing in p and that U is constant. Therefore, employed
workers will adopt a strategy where they exit unemployment whenever p > pR
for some constant pR and switch jobs whenever they receive an offer with p′ > p.
The reservation premium, pR will satisfy
pR = pb + (λ0 − λ1)
∫ ∞
pR
 1 − F˜(p)r + δ + λ1 [1 − F˜(p)]dp
 (A.3)
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A.2 Proof of proposition 3
Proof. For the proof, I suppress dependence on Z,W and Ψ. It is also convenient
to introduce notation. As suggested in the statement of the proposition, stars
added to a distribution indicate that they are the truncated versions of the un-
starred distribution. For instance, g∗(ψ) = g(ψ|ψ > ψ0) Some algebra reveals that
the truncated mean is a mixture
E f ∗(ψ) = a∗Eg∗(ψ) + (1 − a∗)Eh∗(ψ)
= a∗µg∗ + (1 − a∗)µh∗
where a∗ = a(1−G(ψ0))1−aG(ψ0)−(1−a)H(ψ0) Taking derivatives
∂µ f ∗
∂µh
=
∂a∗
∂µh
µg∗ + a
∗∂µg∗
∂µh
− ∂a
∗
∂µh
µh∗ + (1 − a∗)
∂µh∗
∂µh
Eliminating ∂µg∗
∂µh
and rearranging
∂µ f ∗
∂µh
=
∂a∗
∂µh
(
µg∗ − µh∗
)
+ (1 − a∗)∂µh∗
∂µh
Log concavity of h ensures ∂µh∗
∂µh
> 0. Furthermore it is clear that ∂a
∗
∂µh
> 0. Thus, as
long as ∣∣∣∣(µg∗ − µh∗)∣∣∣∣ < (1 − a∗)∂µh∗∂µh∂a∗
∂µh
we have ∂µ f ∗
∂µh
> 0
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A.3 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. The qth quantile of the distribution of observed offers, ψq is defined im-
plicitly by ∫ ψq
f (ψ|ψ > ψ0) =
∫ ψq
ψ0
f (ψ)
1 − F(ψ0)
dψ = q
Which gives
F(ψq) = q + (1 − q)F(ψ0)
Renormalize the offer distribution in terms of deviations from its mean, µ:
F(ψq − µ) = q + (1 − q)F(ψ0 − µ)
First, consider the effect of a shift in the initial offer on the qth quantile of ob-
served jobs
F′(ψq − µ)∂ψ
q
∂ψ0
= (1 − q)F′(ψ0 − µ).
This establishes that a shift in the initial offer is expected to have a positive effect
on all quantiles of the observed offer distribution. The goal is to assess how the
magnitude of this effect varies with respect to the quantile q. Hence, we want to
establish the sign of
∂2ψq
∂q∂ψ0
Note
∂ψq
∂q
=
1 − F (ψ0 − µ)
F′(ψq − µ)
differentiating this with respect to ψ0
∂2ψq
∂q∂ψ0
=
−F′(ψ˜0) − F′′(ψ˜q)∂ψ
q
∂q
∂ψq
∂ψ0
F′(ψ˜q)
where I have replaced ψ − µ = ψ˜ for simplicity
= −F
′(ψ˜0)
F′(ψ˜q)
− F
′′(ψ˜q)(1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0))
F′(ψ˜q)3
.
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When F′′(ψ˜q) > 0, this is negative. Suppose F′′(ψ˜q) < 0 . I will show that ∂
2ψq
∂q∂ψ0
> 0
is impossible as long as
F′(ψ˜q)2∣∣∣F′′(ψ˜q)∣∣∣ ≥ 1 − F(ψ˜q)
This condition simply places limits on the amount of curvature in the density
function. Note that in the case described in the statement of the proposition,
where F′ is a symmetric density function and F is log concave, we have
F′(ψq − µ)2
|F′′(ψq − µ)| =
F′(µ − ψq)2
F′′(µ − ψq) ≥ F(µ − ψ
q) = 1 − F(ψq − µ)
where the first and last equalities follow by symmetry of the density function,
the inequality follows from log concavity. For details on log concave functions
and their application to search models, see Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 2005 or Flinn
and Heckman 1983.
Continuing with the proof, suppose F′′(ψ˜q) < 0 and ∂
2ψq
∂q∂ψ0
> 0. Then
−F′′(ψ˜q)(1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0))
F′(ψ˜q)2
> 1
that is
F′(ψ˜q)2∣∣∣F′′(ψ˜q)∣∣∣ < (1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0))
which by the assumption above implies
1 − F(ψ˜q) < (1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0))
1 −
(
q + (1 − q)F(ψ˜0)
)
< (1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0))
(1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0)) < (1 − q)(1 − F(ψ˜0)),
a contradition. It follows that ∂
2ψq
∂q∂ψ0
< 0.
The proof that ∂
2ψq
∂q∂µ > 0 is analogous.
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APPENDIX B
ENDOGENOUS MOBILITY (WITH JOHN M. ABOWD)
B.1 Details of the Monte Carlo Estimates
B.1.1 Parameters for the Simulated Data
This section presents the parameters used to generate simulated data. The no-
tation is as in the main body of the paper. We use the notation 0 as the employer
productivity class label during spells of unemployment. So, the notation δ10−
denotes the vector of destination probabilities for a worker with ability type 1
who was unemployed. Note also that the columns of δ are ordered so that the
probability of transition to employers of productive type 1 and 2 appear in the
first and second columns. The third column is the probability of transition to
unemployment.
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piA = (0.50, 0.50)
piB = (0.50, 0.50)
piK|AB =

piK|11
piK|12
piK|21
piK|22

=

0.50, 0.50
0.25, 0.75
0.75, 0.25
0.50, 0.50

γ =

γ111
γ112
γ121
γ122
γ10−
γ211
γ212
γ221
γ222
γ20−

=

0.250
0.175
0.100
0.025
0.600
0.150
0.075
0.025
0.025
0.500

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δ =

δ111
δ112
δ121
δ122
δ10−
δ211
δ212
δ221
δ222
δ20−

=

b = 1 b = 2 b = U
0.4 0.1 0.5
0.4 0.4 0.2
0.6 0.2 0.2
0.3 0.5 0.2
0.5 0.5 0.0
0.5 0.2 0.3
0.2 0.7 0.1
0.5 0.4 0.1
0.1 0.8 0.1
0.3 0.7 0.0

θ = (4,−4)
ψ = (2,−2)
µ = (1,−1)
α = 0
σ = 0.1
B.1.2 Summary of the Simulated Data
• Match Rates: 
mK|11
mK|12
mK|21
mK|22

=

0.55, 0.45
0.24, 0.76
0.77, 0.23
0.54, 0.46

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• Separation rates: 
s111
s112
s121
s122
s10−
s211
s212
s221
s222
s20−

=

0.270
0.145
0.090
0.026
0.621
0.143
0.092
0.023
0.033
0.578

• Transition Rates: 
d111
d112
d121
d122
d10−
d211
d212
d221
d222
d20−

=

b = 1 b = 2 b = U
0.30 0.10 0.60
0.35 0.51 0.14
0.83 0.00 0.17
0.31 0.44 0.25
0.46 0.54 0.00
0.49 0.20 0.31
0.06 0.89 0.06
0.70 0.22 0.87
0.09 0.82 0.09
0.31 0.69 0.00

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B.1.3 Posterior Mode
pˆiA = (0.55, 0.45)
pˆiB = (0.50, 0.50)
pˆiK|AB =

pˆiK|11
pˆiK|12
pˆiK|21
pˆiK|22

=

0.55, 0.46
0.25, 0.75
0.76, 0.24
0.56, 0.44

γˆ =

γˆ111
γˆ112
γˆ121
γˆ122
γˆ10−
γˆ211
γˆ212
γˆ221
γˆ222
γˆ20−

=

0.27
0.14
0.09
0.03
0.62
0.14
0.09
0.02
0.03
0.58

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δˆ =

δˆ111
δˆ112
δˆ121
δˆ122
δˆ10−
δˆ211
δˆ212
δˆ221
δˆ222
δˆ20−

=

b = 1 b = 2 b = U
0.30 0.10 0.60
0.35 0.51 0.14
0.83 0.00 0.17
0.31 0.44 0.25
0.46 0.54 0.00
0.49 0.20 0.31
0.06 0.89 0.06
0.70 0.22 0.08
0.09 0.82 0.09
0.31 0.69 0.00

θˆ = (−8, 0)
ψˆ = (4, 0)
µˆ = (2, 0)
αˆ = 1
σˆ = 0.1
B.2 A Proposed IV Estimator Based on Exploitation of the Full
Realized Mobility Network
B.2.1 The IV Estimator
• Organize the data to allow application of the Abowd et al. (2002) solver
for the LS fixed-effects design
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• Solve 
X′X X′D X′F
D′X D′D D′F
F′X F′D F′F


β
θ
ψ

(0)
=

X′y
D′y
F′y
 (B.1)
• Store
[
βˆ
′
θˆ
′
ψˆ
′
]
(0)
First Reduced Form
• Discretize θ(0) onto L fixed points of support. Discretize ψ(0) onto M fixed
points of support.
• Fit a reduced form random graph from adjacency matrices of the discrete
distributions of θ and ψ.
• The reduced form random graph model estimates the transition matrix
Pr
[
brs (t) = 1|bi j (t − 1) = 1 for i, r = 1, . . . , L; j, s = 1, . . . ,M
]
(B.2)
• Details of the estimation of the transition matrix follow the algorithm
• Simulate B˜(t) and D˜ (t) R × (L + M) times. For t = 1, . . . ,T form
Bˆ (t) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
B˜r (t) Dˆ (t) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
D˜r (t) (B.3)
• Define the instrument matrices
Dˆ =

Dˆ (1)
Dˆ (2)
...
Dˆ (T )

Fˆ =

Bˆ (1)
Bˆ (2)
...
Bˆ (T )

(B.4)
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First IV Step
• Solve

β
θ
ψ

(1)
= argmin

(y − Xβ − Dθ − Fψ)′
[
X Dˆ Fˆ
]

X′X X′Dˆ X′Fˆ
Dˆ′X Dˆ′Dˆ Dˆ′Fˆ
Fˆ′X Fˆ′Dˆ Fˆ′Fˆ

−1
[
X Dˆ Fˆ
]′
(y − Xβ − Dθ − Fψ)

(B.5)
• Notice that the instrument matrix
[
X Dˆ Fˆ
]

X′X X′Dˆ X′Fˆ
Dˆ′X Dˆ′Dˆ Dˆ′Fˆ
Fˆ′X Fˆ′Dˆ Fˆ′Fˆ

−1 [
X Dˆ Fˆ
]′
(B.6)
has column rank at most k + L + M whereas the original LS fixed-effects
problem had column rank at most k + I + J − 1.
• The IV estimator for the individual and employer heterogeneity only iden-
tifies effects with dimensionality given by the fixed discretization.
• The IV estimates are consistent in the presence of endogenous mobility
but can be improved by refitting the reduced form random graph model.
• Store
[
βˆ
′
θˆ
′
ψˆ
′
]
(1)
.
Second Reduced Form
• Discretize θˆ(1) onto L fixed points of support. Discretize ψˆ(1) onto M fixed
points of support. Use the same support points as in step 0.
• Re-fit the reduced form random graph using the discrete distributions of
θ and ψ.
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Second IV Step
• Re-simulate B˜(t) and D˜ (t) R × (L + M) times. For t = 1, . . . ,T form
Bˆ (t) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
B˜r (t) Dˆ (t) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
D˜r (t) (B.7)
from the newly simulated adjacency matrices.
• Define new instrument matrices
Dˆ =

Dˆ (1)
Dˆ (2)
...
Dˆ (T )

Fˆ =

Bˆ (1)
Bˆ (2)
...
Bˆ (T )

(B.8)
• Solve
̂
β
θ
ψ

(2)
= argmin

(y − Xβ − Dθ − Fψ)′
[
X Dˆ Fˆ
]

X′X X′Dˆ X′Fˆ
Dˆ′X Dˆ′Dˆ Dˆ′Fˆ
Fˆ′X Fˆ′Dˆ Fˆ′Fˆ

−1
[
X Dˆ Fˆ
]′
(y − Xβ − Dθ − Fψ)

(B.9)
• The resulting θˆ(2) and ψˆ(2) are consistent in the presence of endogenous
mobility and efficient if the bipartite random graph model is true.
p
(
{B}Tt=1 |Θ
)
≡ pdf of bipartite adjacency matrix (B.10)
p (Θ) ≡ pdf of parameter prior (B.11)
So the Markov chain is defined by
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p
(
Θ˜
∣∣∣∣{B˜}Tt=1 , {lnwi}Tt=1 , X ) (B.12)
p
({
B˜
}T
t=1
, {lnwi}Tt=1
∣∣∣Θ˜, X ) (B.13)
Initial estimation of Θ from {B}Tt=1 observed. Then, put workers and firms
into classes (initially 100 each). In ts ihe simulation, the problem is to assign
workers to new firms without locking them into the original (initial) classifica-
tion. Proposed strategy is to do a preliminary inconsistent estimation of AKM
decomposition, then fill the current 100 category classification, run the simula-
tor, draw samples of
{
B˜
}T
t=1
at convergence. Then for each sampled
{
B˜
}T
t=1
, con-
vert back to the original identifier set by a random model with probabilities
developed as follows: put the people back where they came from (same i), use
the estimated mobility model to determine if there has been a transition, if not
leave j unchanged. Otherwise, sample j from the correct current group. Refit
the AKM model with Z˜ averaged over all the draws from the current iteration.
B.3 Formulas for Endogeneity Tests
These formulas are derived and discussed thoroughly in Abowd et al. (2010).
B.3.1 Test 1
εit−1 =
∑
{s|J(i,s)= j∧s<t∧J(i,s),J(i,t)}
ε̂is∑
1 {s|J (i, s) = j ∧ s < t ∧ J (i, s) , J (i, t)} (B.14)
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(average residual for the most recent completed job at j by i)
For all (i, t) where J (i, t − 1) , J (i, t) (job changers) compute the counts
nabcd =
∑
{i,t|J(i,t−1),J(i,t)}
1
{
Q (θi) = a ∧ Q
(
ψJ(i,t−1)
)
= b ∧ Q
(
ψJ(i,t)
)
= c ∧ Q (εit−1) = d
}
(B.15)
and let
piabcd = Pr
{
Q (θi) = a ∧ Q
(
ψJ(i,t−1)
)
= b ∧ Q
(
ψJ(i,t)
)
= c ∧ Q (εit−1) = d
}
(B.16)
then
X2ν1 = Test (piabcd = piabc+pi+++d) (B.17)
where ν1 =
(
# (Q (θi)) × #Q
(
ψJ(i,t−1)
)
× #Q
(
ψJ(i,t)
)
− 1
)
× (#Q (εit−1) − 1)
B.3.2 Test 2
ε˜ jt =
∑
{i|J(i,t)= j}
ε̂it∑
1 {i|J (i, t) = j} (B.18)
(average residual for all employees at j in year t)
For two periods s < t and all firms alive in period s, compute the counts
nabc|s =
∑
j
1 {Q (ψ j) = a ∧ Q (˜ε js) = c} × ∑{i|J(i,s)= j}Q (θi) = b
 (B.19)
and
nabc|t =
∑
j
1 {Q (ψ j) = a ∧ Q (˜ε js) = c} × ∑{i|J(i,t)= j}Q (θi) = b
 . (B.20)
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Note that the two counts are not independent because they condition on the
same distribution of employers alive in period s. Let:
piabc|s = Pr
{
Q
(
ψ j
)
= a ∧ (Q (θi) = b|s) ∧ Q
(˜
ε js
)
= c
}
(B.21)
and
piabc|t = Pr
{
Q
(
ψ j
)
= a ∧ (Q (θi) = b|t) ∧ Q
(˜
ε js
)
= c
}
(B.22)
then
X2ν2 = Test
(
ln
(
piabc|s
piabc|t
)
= ln
(
piab+|s
piab+|t
))
(B.23)
where ν2 = (#Q (θi) − 1)×
(
#Q
(˜
ε js
)
− 1
)
+
(
#Q
(
ψ j
)
− 1
)
×(#Q (θi) − 1)×
(
#Q
(˜
ε js
)
− 1
)
.
Proof
ln
(
piabc|s
piabc|t
)
=
(
µas − µat
)
+
(
µbs − µbt
)
+
(
µcs − µct
)
+
(
γabs − γabt
)
+
(
γacs − γact
)
+
(
γbcs − γbct
)
+
(
ρabcs − ρabct
)
where
(
µas − µat
)
= change in main effects of Q
(
ψ j
)
≡ 0
(
µbs − µbt
)
= change in main effects of Q (θi), with d f = (#Q (θi) − 1)
(
µcs − µct
)
= change in main effects of Q
(˜
ε js
)
≡ 0
(
γabs − γabt
)
= change in interaction Q
(
ψ j
)
and Q (θi), with d f =
(
#Q
(
ψ j
)
− 1
)
×
(#Q (θi) − 1)
(
γacs − γact
)
= change in interaction Q
(
ψ j
)
and Q
(˜
ε js
)
≡ 0
(
γbcs − γbct
)
= change in interaction Q (θi) and Q
(˜
ε js
)
, with d f = (#Q (θi) − 1) ×(
#Q
(˜
ε js
)
− 1
)
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(
ρabcs − ρabct
)
= change in interaction of Q
(
ψ j
)
,Q (θi) and Q
(˜
ε js
)
, with d f =(
#Q
(
ψ j
)
− 1
)
× (#Q (θi) − 1) ×
(
#Q
(˜
ε js
)
− 1
)
Under the null hypothesis
(
γbcs − γbct
)
= 0 and
(
ρabcs − ρabct
)
= 0, the change
in d f is (#Q (θi) − 1) ×
(
#Q
(˜
ε js
)
− 1
)
+
(
#Q
(
ψ j
)
− 1
)
× (#Q (θi) − 1) ×
(
#Q
(˜
ε js
)
− 1
)
.
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